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Trademark owners regularly rely on claims that the defendant is
"free riding" on their mark by making money using that mark,
money the trademark owners say should belong to them. We analyze
those free-riding claims and find them wanting. The empirical data
shows that defendants in unrelated markets can benefit from using a
well-known mark, but that neither mark owners nor consumers suf-
fer any injury from that use. A legal claim that a defendant is
unjustly benefiting by using a plaintiff's mark is hollow unless it is
accompanied by a theory of why that benefit should rightly belong
to the plaintiff And unlike real property, or even other types of in-
tellectual property, trademark law has no such theory. The result is
that free-riding claims fall back on empty circularity. Yet these ar-
guments are-explicitly or implicitly-behind the most problematic
expansions of trademark law in recent years. We suggest that
trademark law needs a theory of trademark injury that distin-
guishes harm to legitimate interests the law should protect from a
mere desire to capture a benefit enjoyed by another
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INTRODUCTION
Black & Decker recently focused its marketing efforts for its DEWALT
line of power tools on Hispanic soccer fans, seeking to grow the DEWALT
brand by "building and executing relevant cultural events and contests."' In
its El Tricolor Contest by DEWALT, for example, Black & Decker gave
soccer fans a chance to win "a signed Adidas Mexico jersey, $1,000 dollars
in Eurosport/SOCCER.COM gift cards, DEWALT Compact Lithium-Ion
combo tool kits, DEWALT Worksite Radio Chargers and gear signed by
Mexican Primera Division players."2 Black & Decker also ran a variety of
promotions linked to soccer matches, like the "Futbol con DeWalt" promo-
tion in which Black & Decker gave two VIP tickets to the September 27,
2007, match between DC United and Chivas to anyone who purchased
$1,500 worth of DEWALT products. The flyer Black & Decker distributed
for this promotion referred to the match as the 2007 DEWALT CUP, though
this was not an official name. For Black & Decker, these promotions were
simply targeted marketing, using Hispanic soccer fans' interest in the sport
to draw attention to the new DEWALT products.
Soccer United Marketing ("SUM"), owner of commercial and match
promotion rights for Major League Soccer, the US Soccer Federation, the
Mexican Men's national team, and other international teams such as Chivas
and FCBarcelona, saw things differently. To SUM, Black & Decker was
engaged in "ambush marketing," wrongly profiting from SUM's trademarks.
SUM therefore filed suit. Though it nominally framed the issue as trade-
mark infringement, SUM's complaint makes abundantly clear that its main
objection to Black & Decker's promotions was that Black & Decker was
1. Press Release, DEWALT Partners with Eurosport to Launch New Compact Lithium
Cordless Products (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.hispanicprwire.com/News/in/15642/18/dewalt-
partners-with-eurosport-to-launch-new-compact%20-lithium-cordless-products (internal quotation
marks omitted). Black & Decker focused these marketing efforts primarily on "key Hispanic mar-
kets": Chicago, Houston/Austin, and Miami. Id.
2. Id. The Mexican national team is often referred to by its nickname, El Tricolor. See,
e.g., La Plaza, http://latimesblogs.latimes.comlaplaza/2009/08/mexico-shows-us-is-no-match-in-
soccer.html (Aug. 13, 2009, 10:25 PST).
3. Complaint at [ 38, Soccer United Mktg., L.L.C. v. Black & Decker Corp., No. 09-CIV-
10378 (S.D.N.Y Dec. 22, 2009).
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interfering with SUM's ability to license its marks exclusively, in this case
particularly because SUM had sold Makita an exclusive license to use the
MLS and DC United marks on power tools.4 Black & Decker, according to
SUM, was confusing the public into believing that Black & Decker had a
right to utilize the names of the teams SUM represents, to depict the jerseys
it was giving away, to promote and give away tickets to games in which
SUM's teams participated, or to set up product displays outside the stadiums
in which those teams were playing. On SUM's account, only those who pay
money to SUM should be able to do these things.
Given the expansiveness of modem trademark law, SUM's arguments
are not obvious losers. SUM is arguing that consumers who encounter Black
& Decker's promotions are likely to be confused about whether there is
some type of sponsorship relationship between Black & Decker and SUM's
soccer teams. If consumers are confused in this way, of course, it's only be-
cause courts have accepted that sports teams should have such exclusive
licensing rights and have thereby created the very expectations they presume
consumers have. But even if consumers do wonder if Black & Decker had
permission, what harm could possibly befall DC United if Black & Decker
sells DEWALT tools in the parking lot outside one of its games? Consumers
are extremely unlikely to attribute to the soccer team any disappointment
they have with DEWALT tools-indeed, they would be very unlikely to do
so even if they were explicitly told there was a sponsorship relationship be-
tween DC United and DEWALT.7 It's possible consumers acquire some
information about DEWALT tools from their misperception of a relationship
with one of the soccer teams, but we find it hard to believe that information
has anything to do with the quality of DEWALT tools. And if it doesn't, any
confusion about sponsorship or affiliation is unlikely to affect consumers'
decisions to purchase DEWALT tools and ought to be irrelevant to trade-
mark law.'
Given the difficulty of articulating harm in conventional trademark
terms, it is not surprising that SUM's complaint makes very little attempt to
demonstrate that consumers will hold DC United responsible for the quality
of DEWALT tools, or that Black & Decker's promotions will harm consum-
ers. Instead, the complaint is filled with accusations that Black & Decker is
free riding and wrongfully benefitting from the soccer teams' goodwill, and
that Black & Decker's actions impair SUM's ability to reap the benefits of
the soccer teams' investments in their brands because "MLS and SUM can
4. Id. at n 15, 31.
5. Id. at 131, 36.
6. See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text (discussing these cases).
7. See Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modem Trademark Law's Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L.
REv. 63, 114-15 (2009) (describing marketing studies focusing on brand alliances and concluding
that consumers do not routinely blame a host brand for its partner's mistakes).




no longer guarantee that, by entering into a licensing agreement, [licensees]
would have the exclusive use of the SUM Marks."9
SUM's free-riding argument is based on the assertion that the owner of a
mark in one context should have the right to control ancillary uses of that
mark in other contexts because the later users are mere free riders, reaping
what they have not sown. These claims are sometimes justified on the theory
that failure to enforce rights against junior, noncompeting users would im-
pede the senior user's ability to enter ancillary markets itself. In other
words, trademark owners argue they should be able to preempt uses of a
mark even in markets in which they do not currently participate, against the
possibility that they will want to use the mark in that market in the future.'o
This claim is contrary to trademark law's long-held maxim that trademark
rights are not rights in gross." But ultimately, the free-riding claims are even
more sweeping than ownership of marks: trademark owners sometimes are
effectively asserting the right to own markets themselves because, as in
SUM's case, the relevant market owes its origin to their brands.
Free-riding and market preemption arguments are not new in trademark
law. But those arguments generally have been tacked on to primary argu-
ments regarding the potential that a later, noncompetitive use might
negatively impact the senior mark owner's reputation for quality. And be-
cause those primary arguments have been so widely accepted, neither courts
nor scholars have expended any serious energy evaluating the market pre-
emption or free-riding arguments. That has been a mistake. First, we believe
the sentiments behind the market preemption and free-riding arguments
have actually motivated courts to impose liability in a number of question-
able cases. Second, as we demonstrated in our prior work, the empirical
case for the reputational dilution claim is much weaker than one might ex-
pect, 2 and the claim that consumers are injured by the defendant's use of a
mark in an unrelated market is implausible except under specialized circum-
stances, circumstances that trademark plaintiffs should have to prove. 3 By
contrast, the empirical evidence confirms both that third parties can benefit
from uses of known marks in markets ancillary to the senior mark owner's
and that those third-party uses can impair the senior user's ability to expand
its own product lines."' Put another way, the evidence suggests that third
parties like Black & Decker might benefit from use of, or proximity to,
9. Complaint, supra note 3, at 37.
10. See infra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
11. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) ("The asserted doc-
trine is based upon the fundamental error of supposing that a trade-mark right is a right in gross or at
large, like a statutory copyright or a patent for an invention, to either of which, in truth, it has little
or no analogy.").
12. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 8, at 429-32; McKenna, supra note 7 at 1010-14; cf
Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 Tx. L.
REV. 507 (2008) (demonstrating the weakness of empirical evidence of dilution).
13. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 8, at 432-35, 449-56.
14. See infra Section M.B and sources cited therein.
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SUM's trademarks, but not that SUM is harmed by such use. The result is a
puzzle for the law: what, if anything, should trademark law do to prevent
practices that benefit the defendant but do not harm the plaintiff?
In this Article, we confront the market preemption and free-riding argu-
ments directly. We believe these arguments actually depart fundamentally
from the traditional bases of trademark law and theory, and in ways that
could prove quite troubling in a competitive economy. The claim that
trademark owners are injured by not being able to control use in a remote
market is ultimately a circular claim-mark owners are injured if, but only
if, we define their trademark rights ex ante to include control over that re-
mote market. The arguments in favor of doing so, however, turn out to be
remarkably weak, and we argue that they do not justify expanding trade-
mark law. If that means that others free ride on the effort a trademark owner
puts into building a brand or making a market, so be it. Free riding itself is
bad only if we think there is some reason to prevent it. We have such a rea-
son, generally, in the patent and copyright contexts: we affirmatively want to
encourage the creation of new works or inventions, and we're concerned
that free riding might undermine incentive to create them. But we don't have
any reason to affirmatively encourage the creation of new brands. In fact,
absent confusion regarding responsibility for the quality of the goods at is-
sue, free riding on brands is likely a good thing, not a bad one, and in any
event isn't the sort of harm trademark law is particularly good at addressing.
The relevant issue should in fact be harm to consumers or to the market as a
whole, not simply the benefit a mark confers on others.
As a result, we propose a "trademark injury" requirement akin to the
"antitrust injury" requirement currently used to weed out undeserving anti-
trust plaintiffs: to sustain an infringement claim, a plaintiff should have to
demonstrate that the defendant's conduct is likely to cause material confu-
sion in the minds of consumers, and allegations of other types of "harm"
should be insufficient.
If we're right, our argument has implications for a number of current
trademark doctrines in which the market preemption and free-riding argu-
ments have come to the fore: broad sponsorship or affiliation claims,
including those in the merchandising context and in the context of expres-
sive works; initial interest and post-sale confusion; and dilution. But it also
has broader implications for the way trademark cases are argued and rea-
soned. The anti-free-riding impulse can corrupt even cases ostensibly
decided on more traditional trademark grounds. As a result, courts must be
particularly vigilant to avoid finding confusion in unlikely circumstances
because of the pull of free-riding concerns.
In Part I, we explain the market preemption and free-riding arguments
and how they differ from the traditional justifications for trademark law. In
Part II, we explain why those arguments are important, and why they are
increasingly driving results in trademark cases. In Part III, we evaluate those
arguments on the merits, finding them wanting. In Part IV, we draw some
broader implications from those evaluations, and in Part V, we suggest that a
141November 20101
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trademark plaintiff should have to show "trademark injury" in order to pre-
vail.
1. THE TRADITIONAL-AND THE IMPLICIT-CASE
FOR TRADEMARK PROTECTION
The arguments for trademark protection in the core cases-those involv-
ing directly competing goods-are fairly straightforward and not terribly
controversial. Trademark law prevents parties from using a mark that is like-
ly to confuse consumers about the source of their goods. In the context of
competing goods, this protects mark owners from diverted trade and con-
sumers from making mistaken purchases. When a second company comes
along and sells Apple computers, that company can capitalize on consumers'
confusion about the source of the new products to divert to itself customers
who are familiar with Apple products and who are trying to patronize the
same Apple company from which they've bought computers before. Apple,
Inc. is harmed directly by this confusion because it loses sales it otherwise
would have made, and indirectly because consumers are likely to lose confi-
dence that they can rely on the Apple mark to distinguish desirable from
undesirable products. Consumers are harmed here too-directly because
they bought something different than they expected, and indirectly because
they won't get to rely on the Apple mark in the future to tell them which
computer products to buy. Hence, mark owner and consumer interests con-
verge to support trademark protection in these cases of competitive goods."
15. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMiC STRUCTURE OF IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 167-68 (2003); Nicholas Economides, Trademarks, in 3 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 601, 602 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (describ-
ing the savings for consumers in product searches as one of "[t]he primary reasons for the existence
and protection of trademarks"); Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78
TRADEMARK REP. 523, 525-27 (1988) (discussing the economic benefits of marks that apprise con-
sumers of products' unobservable features); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark
Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & EcoN. 265, 268-70 (1987) (identifying the lowering of
brand recognition costs to consumers as the justification for trademark law); Mark A. Lemley, The
Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1690-94 (1999) (de-
scribing economic justifications for trademarks and advertising); I. P. L. Png & David Reitman, Why
Are Some Products Branded and Others Not?, 38 J.L. & EcoN. 207, 208-11, 218 (1995) (analyzing
empirical search cost data and suggesting that "consumers of products subject to performance un-
certainty will pay for brand-name assurance"); John F. Coverdale, Comment, Trademarks and
Generic Words: An Effect-on-Competition Test, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 868, 869-70 (1984) (noting that
trademark law encourages competition, which potentially decreases the cost to consumers); Brian A.
Jacobs, Note, Trademark Dilution on the Constitutional Edge, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 161, 164 (2004)
(noting search costs rationale); see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-
64 (1995) (explaining that trademark law "reduce[s] the customer's costs of shopping and making
purchasing decisions," and "helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will
reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product") (internal quota-
tion marks omitted); Union Nat'l Bank of Tex., Laredo v. Union Nat'l Bank of Tex., Austin, 909
F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1990) ("The idea is that trademarks are 'distinguishing' features which lower
consumer search costs and encourage higher quality production by discouraging free-riders."); cf
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942) ("A trade-
mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has
been led to believe he wants.").
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Trademark law protects the integrity of the marketplace by preventing de-
ceptions that change the way consumers buy goods.
But beyond cases of directly competing goods, the arguments get a little
more complicated. The predominant producer-side arguments in favor of
protection against noncompeting uses have focused on the possibility of
negative feedback to the producer's original market. Specifically, the claim
has been that consumers who believe their Apple watches come from the
same company that produced their iPod are likely to direct any dissatisfac-
tion with their watches at the iPod-producing Apple, leading them to
question whether iPods are really that good after all. The worry is that con-
sumers' quality experience in the new market "feeds back" to the original
market. We addressed that argument in our prior paper, surveying the mar-
keting literature and finding surprisingly little evidence that consumers
punished the core brand for what they saw as poor quality extensions into
new markets.16
Two other arguments have frequently been offered in addition to the
quality feedback arguments, and those additional arguments are our primary
focus here. First is the argument that, regardless of whether a mark owner is
held responsible for negative experiences with a junior user's products, the
mark owner is harmed by a noncompeting use because that use might im-
pede the mark owner's ability to expand---either into the same market as the
junior use or other related markets. This argument is not about the present
harm to the producer from third-party uses, but rather the potential future
benefits foreclosed by those uses. Thus, for example, even if Apple, Inc. is
not directly affected by another party's use of the Apple mark for watches
because consumers do not hold Apple, Inc. responsible for the quality of
Apple watches, Apple, Inc. could still claim to be harmed because it would
be unable to expand into the watch market using the Apple mark.
The notion that a mark owner is preempted by a junior user from enter-
ing another market operates on a background assumption that the senior
user ought to have a superior right to enter other markets under "its" mark.
Specifically in the context of the hypothetical above, this argument assumes
that any value the Apple mark has in the watch market rightfully belongs to
Apple and no one else." It is the loss of this market opportunity that quali-
fies as "harm" to Apple. This is a market preemption argument analogous to
the derivative works right in copyright.' The claim is that the trademark
16. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 8. For a detailed analysis of the relevant marketing
literature, see McKenna, supra note 7.
17. Schechter clearly accepted this proposition:
Quite apart from the destruction of the uniqueness of a mark by its use on other goods . .. once
a mark has come to indicate to the public a constant and uniform source of satisfaction, its
owner should be allowed the broadest scope possible for 'the natural expansion of his trade' to
other lines or fields of enterprise.
Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REv. 813, 823 (1927).
18. See infra notes 160-168 and accompanying text.
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holder owns not just the right to use a particular mark in connection with
particular goods, but the mark itself, wherever it has value.
A related theory of harm from preemption might focus on the costs a
producer would be required to incur in re-educating consumers about the
quality of its goods if and when it entered the same market as the junior us-
er. If, for example, Borden-the maker of condensed milk-was unable to
prevent another company from using the Borden name for ice cream'9 and
was forced to enter the ice cream market under a different name (since the
other company would have established priority in the ice cream market), it
would lose the benefits of name recognition among consumers who bought
both ice cream and condensed milk. Here too the claimed injury is that the
defendant's use interferes with the plaintiff's expansion, as this "harm"
could come to fruition only if the senior user in fact expands.20
The market preemption claim is based on a theory of harm to the trade-
mark owner. Because the harm is bound up with the trademark owner's
anticipated entry into another market, the plausibility of the claim is a func-
tion of how likely that entry is. That is a fact-specific question; it seems
reasonable to conclude that Borden would move from making condensed
milk to making ice cream, but perhaps less reasonable that Apple will go
into the watch-making business. Notably, however, when trademark owners
argue market preemption they rarely tie it to concrete evidence of planned
2!entry and likely injury. Instead, what is nominally a factual question about
injury to the trademark owner is often simply presumed as injury: I must
have been hurt because I no longer have an opportunity I once had.
In fact, however, the preemption "injury" also presumes that the trade-
mark owner had a legal right to exclusive use of the mark in that secondary
market. Even if the mark owner can show actual preparations to expand,
there is a deeper question about whether-and why-they should have a
22
superior right to use the mark in the ancillary market. True, in many of the
cases in which the mark owner is in fact planning to expand, the goods are
sufficiently related that consumers are likely to believe the mark owner is
responsible for their quality. And if consumers do believe that, the mark
owner will effectively be protected in their ability to expand under a theory
of consumer harm.23 But if the goods are not so closely related that consum-
19. This was indeed the result in an early case, Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed
Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 514 (7th Cir. 1912), though we are quite confident courts would not reach the
same result today. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 8, at 428 & n.59.
20. We thank Stacey Dogan for suggesting this alternative preemption argument.
21. Indeed, because the traditional likelihood of confusion test includes the likelihood that
the plaintiff will expand into the defendant's market as a factor, AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599
F.2d 341, 354 (9th Cir. 1979); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.
1961), there is arguably no reason to assert market preemption as a separate theory of injury except
in the very cases in which that expansion is unlikely.
22. In the geographic context, the Lanham Act has long permitted such concurrent uses. See
15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (2006).




ers will draw inferences about product quality from the use of a mark, it is
far less clear that the mere fact that a mark owner was planning to enter a
distant market should give it the right to do so. Indeed, in the antitrust con-
text, courts have rejected a very similar argument that firms suffer
cognizable injury when excluded from a market which they are not currently
24
prepared to enter, but hope to enter in the future.
The second argument advanced in support of a trademark owner's right
to control the use of the mark in unrelated markets is a free-riding argument
that is at least nominally distinct from market preemption. On this theory, a
third party that uses Apple for watches simply free rides on the goodwill
developed by Apple, Inc., and third parties should not be allowed to claim
for themselves any value the Apple mark has in the watch market. This ar-
gument appears to be distinct from the market preemption argument in that
the objection to free riding does not depend on a claim that the Apple watch
company harms Apple, Inc., but simply reflects the belief that Apple ought
to own whatever value the Apple mark has in the watch market. While the
market preemption argument says that a mark owner will eventually be
harmed by the defendant's conduct, the free-riding argument claims instead
that the defendant will benefit from the plaintiff's conduct, and that any
such benefit is itself unjust and ought to be paid as a windfall to the trade-
mark owner.
But these claims of harm and benefit ultimately run together, particu-
larly in intellectual property ("IP"), where the entire concept of harm is in
some sense an artificial construct based on the government's decision to
create a right. Trademark owners might claim a harm from free riding by
using the circular argument that if someone benefits from the use of a mark
they own, that benefit belongs to them, and therefore they have been injured
by not being paid a license fee for the right to authorize that use. A similarly
circular argument seems to have carried the day in copyright, undermining
the fair use doctrine.25 Despite the ability to turn any benefit to a third party
into a claim of harm to oneself, we think it is important to understand that
claims that the trademark owner is injured by market preemption are ulti-
mately claims that are based on the asserted ability to capture benefits from
others. The idea that a mark owner is harmed because a defendant interferes
with its ability to expand operates on a presumption that the mark owner
ought to have the right to expand without interference. It's not a harm to the
mark owner to interfere with expansion if we don't define the right ex ante
to include the right to expand.
Thus, market preemption arguments that are not based on actual con-
sumer harm are in essence claims of free riding. Both are premised on the
idea that the law should give a particular trademark owner a right to control
someone else's use of the mark even if consumer decisions aren't affected,
on the theory a mark owner has a claim to any value derived from use of that
24. IIA PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST 349a (3d ed.).
25. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994); Mark A. Lem-
ley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 (2007).
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mark. The next Part explains why these arguments are important, and why
they need to be addressed directly.
II. THE GROWING ROLE OF MARKET PREEMPTION
AND FREE-RIDING ARGUMENTS
The most obvious reason to take market preemption and free-riding ar-
guments seriously is that those arguments are, in fact, actually motivating
courts' decisions in a variety of cases, particularly those at the edges of
trademark protection.
First, market preemption and free-riding arguments have played promi-
nent roles in courts' expansion of trademark law to encompass
noncompeting goods. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century,
courts allowed mark owners to assert claims only against direct competitors,
and they routinely denied claims when the parties' goods were even mod-
26estly different. But courts gradually began to take a more liberal view and
allowed claims against uses of a mark for goods that were only related to
those of the senior user. In Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co.,27 one of
the earliest cases to enforce trademark rights against a noncompetitor, the
court allowed the owner of the AUNT JEMIMA mark for syrup to assert its
rights against a later user of AUNT JEMIMA for flour." Though flour and
syrup are clearly not the same goods, so "no one wanting syrup [can] be
made to take flour," the court believed the products were "so related as to
fall within the mischief which equity should prevent."29 Confusion about the
source of the syrup would put Aunt Jemima's reputation in the defendant's
hands and "will enable [the defendant] to get the benefit of the complain-
ant's reputation and advertisement."30 Likewise, in Stork Restaurant, Inc. v.
Sahati," the court allowed the owner of a New York club called The Stork
Club to assert its rights against a San Francisco club of the same name, even
though such geographically remote clubs clearly do not compete with each
other.32 The court was impressed with the value of the Stork Restaurant mark
26. See Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510 (7th Cir. 1912)
(rejecting the plaintiff's claim that use of the BORDEN mark for ice cream infringed its rights in
BORDEN for milk and related products); see also JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADE-
MARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3, at 12 (2d ed. 1905) ("The qualified right in the
tradename [or a trademark],-a right to prevent a defendant from passing off his goods as those of
the plaintiff by the use of it-exists only with regard to goods of the kind for which the plaintiff uses
it, and to which the connection with his business suggested by the use of the name extends." (quot-
ing DUNCAN M. KERLY, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADE-NAME, AND MERCHANDISE MARKS 475
(2d ed. 1901))).
27. 247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917).
28. Id. at 410.
29. Id. at 409-10.
30. Id.
31. 166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948).
32. Id. Because geographically remote uses cannot divert trade that otherwise would have
gone to the mark owner, trademark law traditionally limited a party's rights to the geographic areas
in which it actually used a mark. See, e.g., Thomas J. Carroll & Son Co. v. Mcllvaine & Baldwin,
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which it thought "wholly adventitious, [and] brought about by continued,
expensive, and spectacular advertising-such as the giving away of one
thousand dollar bills."33 In light of this value, the court thought "[t]he con-
clusion [was] inescapable that the appellees [were] seeking to capitalize on
the publicity that the appellant ha[d] built around the name."3
In Precision Tune, Inc. v. Tune-A-Car Inc.,3 the court characterized the
defendant's use of a confusingly similar mark in a different geographic mar-
ket as "depriv[ing] [the plaintiff] of an opportunity to expand its market." 6
As long as the defendant "continue[d] to employ the deceptively similar
marks and trade dress, [the mark owner could not] attempt to open a fran-
chise because it [could not] guarantee its franchisee's exclusive use of the
mark." And in Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imports Ltd., the court found
that the defendant's use of Vera for cosmetics and toiletries infringed the
plaintiff's rights in the same mark, which it had used for women's scarves,
sportswear, and linens.39 In so doing, the court emphasized the plaintiff's
interest in being able to enter a related field at some future time.40
We think the influence of the free-riding and market preemption argu-
ments also explains the merchandising cases. These cases involve uses of
the names or logos of professional sports franchises or universities to adorn
clothing or other merchandise. They strain traditional trademark principles
41
because, at least at the time the cases first arose in the 1970s and 1980s,
there was little reason to think consumers believed the franchises or univer-
sities were the sources of merchandise simply because it depicted their
marks. In spite of the weakness of the confusion arguments, courts in some
cases found infringement because they were moved by their belief that the
defendants were mere free riders. In Boston Professional Hockey Associa-
42
tion v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufacturing, Inc., for example, the first
case to expand trademark rights to include merchandising, the court found
the conclusion "inescapable that, without plaintiffs' marks, defendant would
183 F. 22, 26-28 (2d Cir. 1910) (distinguishing between the Baltimore and New York markets for
whiskey and denying the plaintiff, which had prior rights in Baltimore, the right to prevent use of the
same mark in New York).
33. Stork Rest., Inc., 166 F.2d at 356.
34. Id.
35 611 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. La. 1984).
36. Id. at 368.
37. Id.
38. 544 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1976).
39. Id. at 1172.
40. Id. The court identified two other relevant interests: the mark owner's interest in "protect-
ing the good reputation associated with his mark from the possibility of [it] being tarnished by
inferior merchandise of the junior user," and the "public's interest in not being misled by confus-
ingly similar marks." Id.
41. See generally Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile
Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461 (2005) (discussing the recent vintage of merchandis-
ing claims).
42. 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975).
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not have a market for his particular product among ice hockey fans desiring
to purchase emblems embroidered with the symbols of their favorite
teams."43 And the case that gave the Boston Athletic Association exclusive
control over Boston Marathon t-shirts was even clearer about its rationale:
"Defendants' shirts are clearly designed to take advantage of the Boston
Marathon and to benefit from the good will associated with its promotion by
plaintiffs. Defendants thus obtain a 'free ride' at plaintiffs' expense.'
The "right" to control merchandise that includes a school or team
name-a right unheard of before 1975-has since expanded apace, to the
extent that you can now violate a university's trademark rights without using
its name or logo at all, merely by selling t-shirts in the colors of the school.45
The culprit again is the anti-free-riding impulse: "Smack's alleged competi-
tive disadvantage in the ability to sell game day apparel relates solely to an
inability to take advantage of the Universities' reputation.. . . This is not an
advantage to which it is entitled under the rubric of legitimate competi-
tion."46
Something similar seems to be driving the results in a third set of trade-
mark cases, those involving products based on copyrighted works. Authors
of books, comics, and movies create characters and worlds. They are enti-
tled to copyright in the works they create, including characters that are
sufficiently well delineated.47 But they have also managed to persuade courts
that they should have trademark rights not just in titles or brands, but in
those same characters and other objects that appear within their creative
works. The argument is again a free-riding argument-that no one should be
43. Id.at1oll.
44. Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Univ. of Ga.
Athletic Ass'n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (enjoining use of Battlin' Bulldog beer
when "the confusion stems not from the defendant's unfair competition with the plaintiff's products,
but from the defendant's misuse of the plaintiff's reputation and good will as embodied in the plain-
tiff's mark"); Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Sethscot Collection, No. 98-CV-2102, 2000 WL 34414961, at
*9 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2000) ("[Tihe confusion factor is met where, as here, the registered mark ... is
the triggering mechanism for the sale of the product."); cf Univ. Book Store v. Bd. of Regents, 33
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (T.T.A.B. June 22, 1984) ("[The] antiquated view of trademarks as harmful
monopolies which must be rigorously confined within traditional bounds [is] outmoded and not in
accordance with more recent cases.").
45. Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550
F.3d 465, 477-78 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that universities' color schemes are protectable and that
others' use of those colors on t-shirts evoking the universities infringed their rights).
46. Id. at 488.
47. Judge Learned Hand famously described the difference between protectable and unpro-
tectable characters in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.:
If Twelfth Night were copyrighted, it is quite possible that a second comer might so closely
imitate Sir Toby Belch or Malvolio as to infringe, but it would not be enough that for one of
his characters he cast a riotous knight who kept wassail to the discomfort of the household, or
a vain and foppish steward who became amorous of his mistress. These would be no more than
Shakespeare's "ideas" in the play, as little capable of monopoly as Einstein's Doctrine of Rela-
tivity, or Darwin's theory of the Origin of the Species. It follows that the less developed the
characters, the less they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking
them too indistinctly.
45 F.2d 119, 121 (7th Cir. 1930).
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able to sell products or write books that evoke Wolverine or James Bond,
not because doing so hurts the creator, but because it makes money for the
user, and that money should belong to the creator. In Warner Bros., Inc. v.
Gay Toys, Inc.,4 8 the court justified a copyright owner's trademark control
over toy replicas of the General Lee, an automobile featured in Warner's
television series The Dukes of Hazzard, by claiming that "deny[ing] Warner
Bros. injunctive relief would . . . enable Gay Toys 'to reap where [i]t ha[d]
not sown.' "49 And DC Comics has prevailed in a number of cases against
writers who featured similar superheroes.so Notably, the courts in those cases
found it unnecessary to engage in classical likelihood-of-confusion analysis,
instead resting their liability findings on evidence of similarity between the
characters."
Courts have reached similar results in replica cases outside the copyright
context. Vehicle manufacturers have sued companies that make toy replicas
of the vehicles in which their manufacturers claim trade-dress rights. In
General Motors Corp. v. Lanard Toys, Inc. ,52 for example, GM sued a com-
pany that sold toy military vehicles that resembled the Humvee military
vehicle, claiming the toy vehicle infringed its trade-dress rights in the design
of the real Humvee." Though the markets for toy military vehicles and
Humvees obviously are quite distinct, the court found the "relatedness of the
goods and services" factor to favor General Motors, suggesting "the toy car
is quite closely related to the actual car on which the registered trademark of
the grille is found."5 4 Influenced by that determination and its conclusion
that Lanard had bad intent because "there [was] undisputed evidence that
the design of the front grille of Lanard's toys was copied directly from the
Hummer vehicle,"" the court concluded that Lanard's toy was likely to
48. 724 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1983).
49. Id. at 334 ("It is because of that association, the identification of the toy car with its
source, Warner's television series, that the toy car is bought by the public. That is enough [for an
infringement claim against an imitator].").
50. See, e.g., DC Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1984);
DC Comics Inc. v. Filmation Assocs., 486 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
51. Filmation, 486 F. Supp. at 1276-77. For criticism of these decisions, see Valerie McCon-
nell, The Expansion of Trademark Rights in Graphic Characters and the Need for a Trademark
Misuse Defense (working paper 2010) (on file with author).
52. 468 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2006).
53. Id. at 405. Lanard originally produced and sold a toy vehicle called the "Mudslinger,"
which was modeled after the Humvee, including a similar grille design. In fact, the box for the
Mudslinger referred to the toy vehicle as a "Hyper Humvee." After correspondence with AM Gen-
eral, however, Lanard agreed to stop using the "Humvee" name on its toys. Lanard continued to
manufacture the Mudslinger toy, but later ceased selling the Mudslinger and began producing an-
other vehicle with a similar design called "THE CORPS! ATK." That toy was the subject of the
lawsuit. Id. at 411.
54. Id. at 414.
55. Id. at 413.
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cause confusion and enjoined the use.56 GM itself never made replica Hum-
vees, nor had it licensed anyone else to do so. And it's hard to imagine how
toy vehicles in any way harm GM's sales of real military vehicles. GM's
concern was that Lanard's toy Humvees would interfere with any future li-
censing of the Humvee design to toy makers. Perhaps inspired by GM's
success, Paccar, Inc. recently filed a similar suit against the maker of rep-
lica, scaled model trucks that resembled Paccar's KENWORTH and
PETERBILT trucks.5' Paccar claimed that the defendant's replica trucks
harmed it because the replicas competed with scaled model trucks produced
under license from Paccar.59
Courts have understood in these cases, as in the merchandising cases,
that substantial value was at stake, and their sense that the value belonged to
the mark owner clearly influenced their decisions. And the same is true of
many commentators. Indeed, in arguing against the so-called "trademark use
doctrine," Dinwoodie and Janis express concern that reading the "'use as a
mark' requirement strictly as incorporating the notion of the mark as a
'source-identifierf' . . . might undermine the multi-billion dollar industry of
brand merchandising and product design."6
Fourth, we see evidence of free-riding concerns in keyword advertising
cases. Competitors commonly buy from search engines the right to have
their advertisements triggered by search queries that include others' trade-
marks (a process known as "keyword advertising"). While trademark
owners sometimes articulate an argument that advertisers are confusing con-
sumers by placing ads that appear opposite search results, a growing number
of cases allege that the direct infringer is not the advertiser but the search
engine itself.6' No one would think that an internet search engine necessarily
sponsors or endorses the whatever products are found in the search, which is
probably why the plaintiffs in these cases do not even allege confusion
56. Id. at 405. The court also rejected Lanard's functionality defense, finding that "the plain
appearance of the vehicle shows that the elements which comprise its trade dress are inherently non-
functional." Id. at 417. We don't know what "inherently non-functional" means either.
57. This explains the court's findings that:
The factors of "marketing channels used" and "likelihood of expansion of product lines" do
not strongly favor either party . ... There appears to be no evidence of how the marketing for
either product might overlap, and while General Motors states it has considered making Hum-
mer toys, there is no real proof that the company is seriously considering this possibility.
Id. at 414. It makes the finding on relatedness of goods rather odd, however.





60. Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trade-
mark Law, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1597, 1654 (2007).
61. See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009); Am. Airlines,
Inc. v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 4:08-CV-626-A, 2009 WL 381995 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2009); Google, Inc.
v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-5340 JF (RS), 2007 WL 1159950 (N.D. Cal. April
18,2007); Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004).
150 [Vol. 109:137
Owning Mark(et)s
about the source of the search engines' services.62 Nonetheless, courts have
permitted claims against search engines to proceed on the theory that the
search engine is making money in a way that involves some internal use of a
trademark.
Fifth, we see the influence of the free-riding impulse in initial-interest
and post-sale confusion cases. Mark owners claim initial-interest confusion
in cases where the defendant does something that draws attention to itself in
a way that might momentarily confuse consumers, but where any such con-
fusion is likely to be dispelled before consumers make any purchasing
decisions. Precisely because initial-interest confusion is temporally discon-
nected from purchasing decisions, these cases are difficult to justify with
ordinary confusion-based arguments. Hence, not surprisingly, courts tend to
fall back on epithets here, too. In Brookfield Communications Inc. v. West
Coast Entertainment Corp.,6 for example, the court concluded the defen-
dant's use of "moviebuff" in the metatags for its website violated the
plaintiff's rights in that mark because search engines used the metatags to
generate search results in which the defendant's site appeared higher in the
rankings than the plaintiffs.6 1 While the court conceded that confusion was
unlikely," it believed consumers, now presented with both websites in re-
sponse to a search employing "moviebuff' as a search term, might choose
the defendant's website rather than the plaintiff's:
Although there is no source confusion in the sense that consumers know
they are patronizing West Coast rather than Brookfield, there is neverthe-
less initial interest confusion in the sense that, by using "moviebuff.com"
or "MovieBuff" to divert people looking for "MovieBuff" to its web site,
West Coast improperly benefits from the goodwill that Brookfield devel-
oped in its mark.6
Similarly in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp.," the court
found that Pegasus Petroleum infringed Mobil Oil's flying horse (a Pegasus)
by adopting the name Pegasus Petroleum for its oil trading company." The
Second Circuit was moved by its belief that an oil trader "might listen to a
cold phone call from Pegasus Petroleum . . . when otherwise he might not,
62. As one of us has explained, aside from the "trademark use" issue, these claims ought to
fail because they do not allege actionable infringement under the Lanham Act. See Mark P. McKen-
na, Trademark Use and the Pmblem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 773, 819-21 (noting that these
cases fail to allege confusion about the source of the search engines' services).
63. See, e.g., Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 129.
64. 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
65. Id. at 1066.
66. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062 ("[Ilt is difficult to say that a consumer is likely to be con-
fused about whose site he has reached or to think that Brookfield somehow sponsors West Coast's
web site.").
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987).
69. Id. at 260.
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because of the possibility that Pegasus Petroleum is related to Mobil.,,70 And
in Elvis Presley Enterprises v. Capece," the court noted that "initial-interest
confusion is beneficial to the Defendants because it brings patrons in the
door" which "is even more significant because the Defendants' bar some-
times charges a cover charge for entry, which allows the Defendants to
benefit from initial-interest confusion before it can be dissipated by entry
into the bar."72
In the post-sale confusion cases, courts have found use of a mark in-
fringing even when there is no evidence consumers of the defendant's goods
are likely to be confused at the time of purchase. Mark owners in these cases
claim, and courts have accepted, that it is enough if others who come into
contact with the goods after purchase might be confused. Courts in these
cases do not demand proof the allegedly confused nonpurchasers are ever
likely to be consumers of the mark owner's goods, nor do they demand evi-
dence the alleged confusion away from the point of sale would actually
affect purchasing decisions. They don't demand this evidence, in our view,
because these are really cases about free riding, not confusion.
In the earliest post-sale confusion case, Mastercrafters Clock & Radio
Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. , Judge Frank was
concerned that:
[Alt least ... some customers would buy [the copier's] cheaper clock for
the purpose of acquiring the prestige gained by displaying what many visi-
tors at the customers' homes would regard as a prestigious article. [The
copier's] wrong thus consisted of the fact that such a visitor would be like-
ly to assume that the clock was an Atmos clock.74
As Professor McCarthy has noted, the real concern of these cases is that
"consumers could acquire the prestige value of the senior user's product by
buying the copier's cheap imitation.""
More recently, the Ninth Circuit made abundantly clear what it saw as
the basis for the post-sale confusion doctrine: "Post-purchase confusion cre-
ates a free-rider problem."" And in the Ninth Circuit's view, free riding is
such a problem that it trumps the first-sale doctrine, collapsing yet another
trademark "defense" into the prima facie case." Hence, in Au-Tomotive Gold
70. Id. at 259. Importantly in that case, Mobil had used the name Pegasus in addition to its
flying horse logo in its own oil business. Id. at 256.
71. 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998).
72. Id. at 204.
73. 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1955).
74. Id. at 466.
75. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 23:7, at 23-54 (4th ed. 2010).
76. Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., No. 08-16005, 2010 WL
1794018, at *5 (9th Cir. May 6, 2010).
77. See William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IowA L. REv. 49, 66-71




the court found the defendant's conduct infringing when it purchased genu-
ine Volkswagen badges from an authorized Volkswagen dealer and used the
badges to adorn license plate frames." It found infringement even though no
purchasers of the license plate frames were confused about the source of the
frames and Auto Gold packaged the frames with labels making clear that the
frames were not produced or sponsored by Volkswagen." The concern was
simply that "a person on the street who sees an Auto Gold marquee license
plate with a VW badge will associate the plate with Volkswagen," because
"customers buy marquee license plates principally to demonstrate to the
general public an association with Volkswagen.",o This post-sale "associa-
tion" was enough for the court to find infringement: "If the producer
purchases such a trademarked product and uses that product to create post-
purchase confusion as to the source of a new product, the producer is free
riding even though it has paid for the trademarked product.""
This result is particularly problematic because it takes the idea of own-
ing markets to another level." In the noncompeting-goods context, mark
owners are arguing that they should have the exclusive right to use a mark in
the ancillary markets. They claim, in other words, to own the right to use the
mark in any market in which that mark has value. But in Au-Tomotive Gold,
as in the merchandising cases, the court allowed a mark owner to use trade-
mark law to capture an actual market, as Volkswagen owners were not likely
to be satisfied with accessories bearing a Toyota logo or without any logo at
all." Volkswagen owners want Volkswagen accessories for the same reason
farmers with green farm equipment want other green farm equipment" and
78. 2010 WL 1794018, at *4-5.
79. Id. at *1.
80. Id. at *4. This is consistent with Professor McCarthy's acknowledgement that the real
concern in post-sale confusion cases is that "consumers could acquire the prestige value of the sen-
ior user's product by buying the copier's cheap imitation." MCCARTHY, supra note 75, § 23:7, at 23-
54.
81. Au-Tomotive Gold, 2010WL 1794018, at *5.
82. The result is problematic as a pure doctrinal matter as well. The first-sale doctrine is a
defense to a trademark cause of action. And a defense that does not apply whenever infringement is
shown-which is what the court holds-isn't much of a defense. See KP Permanent Make-up, Inc.
v. Lasting Impression 1, 543 U.S. 11l, 121 (2004) (rejecting a parallel conclusion by the Ninth
Circuit about the fair use defense).
83. This is the intuition expressed by Justice Breyer in the oral argument for American Nee-
dle, Inc. v. National Football League:
And I just heard you say that ... you want the Red Sox to compete in selling T-shirts with the
Yankees; is that right? [MR. NAGER: The ability to compete. Yes.] Yes. Okay. I don't know a
Red Sox fan who would take a Yankees sweatshirt if you gave it away. I mean, I don't know
where you're going to get your expert from that is going to say there is competition ... be-
tween those two products. I think they would rather-they would rather wear a baseball, a
football, a hockey shirt.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (No. 08-661), available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov/ oral argumenttranscripts/08-661.pdf.
84. See Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 96-98 (S.D. Iowa 1982), aff'd, 721
F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding the color green functional for front-end loaders because farmers
prefer the coloring of their loaders to that of their tractors).
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owners of baroque-style silverware want other baroque silverware." Yet the
court was unconcerned about giving Volkswagen control over the market for
Volkswagen accessories: "It may be true that Auto Gold's activities serve to
reduce the price paid by consumers for marquee plates. But trademark law
protects trademark holders from the competition that results from trademark
infringement, irrespective of its effect on prices." And in the Ninth Circuit,
at least, it apparently prevents competition even by those who are reselling
goods they have already bought from the trademark owner.
Finally, theories of market preemption also seem to underlie the doctrine
of trademark dilution.8" One of us has argued that, properly construed, dilu-
18tion is based on a theory of consumer harm. But there is no question that
much of the rhetoric used by both courts and commentators to justify dilu-
tion has focused on the idea of a trademark as a property right that confers
control over noncompeting uses whether or not consumers are hurt.8 In-
deed, the Supreme Court-in the course of restricting dilution law-said
that "[u]nlike traditional infringement law, the prohibitions against trade-
mark dilution ... are not motivated by an interest in protecting
consumers."9 And Judge Posner has even suggested that free riding itself
can be considered a form of dilution.9'
Several cases that might be regarded as dilution-by-tarnishment cases
depend in significant part on the courts' perceptions that the defendants
were making illegitimate use of the plaintiff's marks as "triggering mecha-
nisms" in order to sell their own goods. In Chemical Corp. of America v.
85. See Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 80-81 (2d
Cir. 1990) (finding the design of Wallace's GRANDE BAROQUE line functional because baroque
design elements are necessary to compete in the market for baroque silverware); see also Keene
Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding the design of a lighting fixture
functional because it was designed to match the architecture of the building in which it was
mounted).
86. Au-Tomotive Gold, 2010 WL 1794018, at *6. This statement would be accurate, and
unproblematic, if it were confined to cases in which the defendant's use caused confusion about the
actual source of a product. Our ability to sell "M&M" candies for less than Mars, Inc., for example,
should not lead courts to conclude that our use of the M&M mark does not infringe when applied to
candies. But it's much different to say that trademark law protects Mars from competition from an
ice cream shop that buys genuine M&M's and mixes them into its ice cream.
87. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
88. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 41. The other of us doubts the empirical premises on
which this argument rests; cf Tushnet, supra note 12 (exploring the foundations of blurring claims
in cognitive science). But that's an argument for another day.
89. See Jerre B. Swann, An Intuitive Approach to Dilution, 89 TRADEMARK REP. 907 (1999);
Jerre B. Swann & Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Dilution, An Idea Whose Time Has Gone; Brand Equity as
Protectable Property, The New/Old Paradigm, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 267 (1994).
90. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003). Courts are not alone in
this regard. Though he is careful to note that an investment in goodwill is not enough by itself to
create trademark rights, Tom McCarthy, the author of the leading trademark treatise, argues that
"[tlhe creation of value in a trademark requires 'the expenditure of great effort, skill and ability' and
a competitor should not be permitted to take a 'free ride' on the trademark owner's good will and
reputation." I MCCARTHY, supra note 75, § 2:30, at 2-54.
91. Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 2002).
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Anheuser-Busch, Inc., for example, the court found the defendant's use of
the slogan "Where there's life, there's bugs" to infringe the plaintiff's slogan
"Where there's life, there's Bud" because of the defendant's "brazen ...
effort ... to capitalize on the good will created by . .. the plaintiff" and the
"peculiarly unwholesome association" the slogan created with Budweiser
beer.93 Anheuser-Busch also won a tarnishment claim against the Buttwiper
brand of dog toys. 94 Not surprisingly, the success of these "association"
claims has encouraged others, like The North Face's recent lawsuit against a
company called "The South Butt," which makes clothing featuring, well, a
butt.95
And it is not just in the United States that courts strive to prevent free
riding even absent a theory of harm to the plaintiff. A Canadian court inter-
preted a provision of the Canadian Trade-Marks Act9 to prevent truthful
comparative advertising on the theory that that advertising enabled the de-
fendant to "free ride" on the plaintiff's brand investment.97 And more
recently, the European Court of Justice declared that European Union law
prevents companies from taking advantage of the prestige of well-known
marks in order to boost sales, even if the copycat products do not directly
harm the owner of the mark or create a likelihood of confusion.98 In that
case, L'Or6al objected to Bellure NV, a Belgian perfume manufacturer, ad-
vertising and selling perfume that imitated L'Or6al products but obviously
did not come from L'Or6al. In particular, L'Or6al was upset with the pack-
aging of Bellure's perfume, which was similar to that of some of L'Or6al's
famous fragrance brands, including Tresor and Miracle. L'Or6al also found
Bellure's advertising unfair, as Bellure advertised its scents on a list along-
side L'Or6al's scent names. The court found that, despite the lack of any
consumer confusion, Bellure took advantage of the distinctive character of
L'Or6al's marks in order to benefit from the prestige and power of attraction
of those marks and to exploit the marketing efforts expended by L'Or6al."
92. 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962).
93. Id. at 437-38. But see Ringling Bros.-Bamum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999) (rejecting a similar claim: that the Utah slogan
"Greatest Snow on Earth" diluted the plaintiff's slogan "Greatest Show on Earth").
94. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. VIP Prods., LCC, 666 F Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Mo. 2008). Amaz-
ingly, the court also found for Anheuser-Busch on likelihood-of-confusion grounds after crediting
Anheuser-Busch's survey, which purported to show "that 30.3% of those surveyed had the mistaken
belief that 'Buttwiper' is made or put out by or with the approval or sponsorship of the maker of
'Budweiser'-Plaintiff-or that there is a business relationship between the maker of 'Budweiser'
and the maker of 'Buttwiper.'" Id. at 983.
95. See Sarah Netter, The North Face vs. The South Butt: Entrepreneurial Teen Undaunted
by Lawsuit Threat, ABCNEWS, Oct. 1, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/teens-south-butt-
apparel-irks-north-face/story?id=8712101.
96. Trade-marks Act, R.S.C., ch. T-13, § 22(1) (2010) ("No person shall use a trade-mark
registered by another person in a manner that is likely to have the effect of depreciating the value of
the goodwill attaching thereto.").
97. Clairol Int'l Corp. v. Thomas Supply & Equip. Co., [1968] 2 Ex. C.R. 552.




The ruling by Europe's highest court opens the door for brand owners to
take renewed action against the producers of look-alike products and repre-
sents a major shift in European IP law, which has typically supported the
legitimacy of comparative advertising.'00
We should be clear that our objection is not to any of these various doc-
trines per se. Trademark owners may-or may not-be able to show that
consumers are injured by sports merchandise sold by a manufacturer unaf-
filiated with a team, by Google selling ad space opposite search results, by
web sites momentarily diverting surfers' attention with a URL, or by home-
less people wearing knock-off Rolexes.' Similarly, trademark owners may
or may not be able to show that consumers are actually made worse off by
the blurring or tarnishment of marks. What is notable is that each of these
doctrines are extensions of basic trademark law into areas in which the harm
to consumers is questionable at best.102 And yet courts don't seem to be ask-
ing the hard questions about that putative consumer harm. The market
preemption and free-riding arguments have served to distract attention from
the question of whether consumers are in fact confused to their detriment-
or, in the case of dilution, whether they are otherwise harmed-by such
uses. In so doing, those arguments have contributed to the expansion of
trademark law beyond its traditional conceptual moorings.
m. EVALUATING CLAIMS TO OWN MARK(ET)S
Notwithstanding their strong emotional appeal, free-riding claims actu-
ally run counter to what has long been a fundamental principle of trademark
law: its grant, not of rights in a mark "in gross," but of rights tailored to the
actual use made of a mark by its owner. Trademark owners do not own
words, at least not traditionally.'o3 Rather, they own the right to prevent the
100. As Dev Gangjee and Robert Burrell state:
It must be remembered that the [Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive
("MCAD")] exists to prevent a blanket prohibition on comparative advertising and the default
position under the MCAD is that such advertising is allowed. By adopting an expansive read-
ing of Art. 3a(1)(h), the "imitations and replicas" exclusion, the ECJ may have insulated
reputed marks from a range of competitive comparisons.
Dev Gangjee & Robert Burrell, A Brief Note on L'Oreal and the Prohibition on Free Riding 14
(Dec. 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1491402.
101. Though we rather doubt they can.
102. On the merits of these various claims, see, for example, Lemley & McKenna, supra note
8 (sponsorship or affiliation claims); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 41 (merchandising); Stacey L.
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 Hous. L.
REV. 777 (2004) (keyword advertising); Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trade-
mark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507 (2005); Michael Grynberg, The Road Not Taken: Initial Interest
Confision, Consumer Search Costs, and the Challenge of the Internet, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 97
(2004) (initial interest confusion); Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 960
(1993) (luxury goods and post-sale confusion).
103. Ringling Bros.-Bamum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev.,
170 F.3d 449, 459 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e simply cannot believe that, as a general proposition, Con-
gress could have intended, without making its intention to do so perfectly clear, to create property
rights in gross, unlimited in time (via injunction), even in 'famous' trademarks.").
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use of certain similar words in certain places in connection with the sale of
certain goods in a way that is likely to confuse consumers. Market pre-
emption claims presuppose a right to control use outside those boundaries.
While some such claims-like the Borden case-can be justified on con-
sumer harm grounds, most cannot. They therefore stretch the traditional
account of trademark theory. And if market preemption claims stretch
trademark theory, free-riding claims discard that theory altogether, claiming
trademarks are precisely what trademark law and theory have long main-
tained they aren't: rights in gross over a mark itself.
The fact that these arguments run counter to tradition is not, of course,
sufficient reason to reject them. But it does mean that the arguments are
worthy of close scrutiny-scrutiny that has so far been lacking. For if we are
persuaded that market preemption and free riding are appropriate considera-
tions in shaping the scope of trademark law, we may well find ourselves
with a radically different trademark law-indeed, one that would have to
change even more than it already has. Specifically, if we are to take seri-
ously the logic of market preemption and free-riding arguments, trademark
law need not retain the likelihood-of-confusion determination as its central
feature.'0o Market preemption arguments are essentially about allocation of
markets. That allocation need not have anything to do with whether con-
sumers are confused. It is probably no wonder, then, that we see these
arguments carrying the most weight precisely in those cases in which the
consumer confusion arguments are weakest.
We believe the time has come for these arguments to be given serious at-
tention in the trademark context. In this Part, we examine the empirical
evidence behind both the market preemption and the free-riding claims.
A. Traditional Quality Feedback Arguments
Lack Empirical Support's
The empirical case for the argument most frequently offered in favor of
broad trademark protection-the quality feedback argument-is much
104. To that end, the Supreme Court has held:
There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an estab-
lished business or trade in connection with which the mark is employed. The law of trade-
marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition; the right to a particular mark
grows out of its use, not its mere adoption; its function is simply to designate the goods as the
product of a particular trader and to protect his good will against the sale of another's product
as his; and it is not the subject of property except in connection with an existing business.
United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918).
105. See Swann & Davis, supra note 89, at 269 (recognizing that courts fudge the likelihood-
of-confusion analysis in cases in which the defendant is perceived to have taken a free ride). Swann
and Davis argue that "[gliven the current economic function and acceptance of trademarks, and
recognition of their value and performance in the market place," evidence of the defendant using the
mark as a "triggering mechanism" to capitalize on the good will created by the plaintiff "alone
should mandate relief whether or not confusion is present." Id.
106. Sections B.A and B are adapted from McKenna, supra note 7, and Lemley & McKenna,
supra note 8.
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weaker than most suppose. Research regarding brand extensions suggests
that consumers generally do not alter their global evaluations of brands (i.e.,
their assessments of the brand's quality) when they encounter negative
information about related products offered under the same mark."" Even
negative personal experiences with a product are likely to have an effect
only for closely related products, and even then only for family branded
rather than sub-branded extensions. o0 Moreover, even in the context of suc-
cessive extensions the only apparent risk to a core brand from a failed
extension is that consumers will evaluate future extensions more negatively
than they otherwise might have.'" And even when negative information does
affect a parent brand, it does so only in an abstract sense; it does not impact
brand image for the parent brand in the context of the goods the parent pre-
viously offered."o
Extension information is also unlikely to negatively impact specific
brand beliefs, even when the extension is incongruent with those brand be-
liefs."' And just as with global brand beliefs, any impact an extension has on
107. The few studies that have found some effect on global brand assessments have involved
umbrella branding of extremely closely related products. In one study, for example, Tulin Erdem
estimated a model using scanner data regarding purchases of umbrella-branded toothbrushes and
toothpaste. Tilin Erdem, An Empirical Analysis of Umbrella Branding, 35 J. MARKETING RES. 339,
347 (1998). Erdem concluded that variance in the quality of toothbrushes given away as free sam-
ples from the owner of a known toothpaste brand had some cross-category effects (i.e., consumers
updated their quality expectations of the toothpaste and bought less of it). But even here the effects
were "small in magnitude," and that was in a study in which the brand owner explicitly tied the
extension product to the core product. Any uses that would fall in this category of sufficiently close-
ly related uses almost certainly fall within the zone we describe in Irrelevant Confusion. Lemley &
McKenna, supra note 8.
108. See Sanjay Sood & Kevin Lane Keller, The Effects of Brand Name Structure and Product
Experience on Brand Extension Evaluations and Parent Brand Dilution (unpublished manuscript)
(draft on file with authors). Sood and Keller tested extensions of the Pepsi and Tropicana brands to
vitamin fortified cola and sodium free orange juice. Subjects in their pretest regarded vitamin forti-
fied cola as similar to Pepsi but dissimilar to Tropicana, and sodium free orange juice as dissimilar
to Pepsi and similar to Tropicana. Sood and Keller tested these similar and dissimilar extensions
under family branding (Tropicana cola) and sub-branding (Quencher by Tropicana cola) conditions.
They found that "dilution effects in parent brand evaluations are evident only when consumers
1) have a negative experience with a brand extension that 2) has a high degree of similarity (e.g., in
the case of a family-branded line extension)." Id. at 21. Sood and Keller also find that "sub-branding
strategies can offer the 'best of both worlds' by both enhancing extension evaluations and protecting
the parent brand from any unwanted negative feedback." Id. at 22.
109. See infra note 146.
110. Thus, for example, Joseph Chang found that the general brand image of the parent brand
of Sprite products was diluted by both of two unfavorable extension products: Sprite orangeades and
Sprite washing-up liquids. Joseph W. Chang, Will a Family Brand Image be Diluted by an Unfavor-
able Brand Extension? A Brand Trial-Based Approach, 29 ADVANCES CONSUMER REs., 299, 302
(2002). At the same time, however, neither unfavorable extension diluted the image of Sprite lemon-
ades, the original product offered under the parent brand. Id.
Ill. Congruence here is defined in terms of keeping with the dominant concept of the brand,
which is conceived of as primarily functional, symbolic, or experiential. Congruence differs from
product category-related effects in that an extension could be seen as incongruent even when it is in
a similar product class. Consumers, for example, might regard a new Rolls-Royce economy car as
incongruent with the Rolls-Royce brand image, even though the new car is in the same broad cate-
gory as Rolls-Royce luxury vehicles. Helge Thorbjornsen, Brand extensions: brand concept
congruency and feedback effects revisited, 14 J. PRODUCT & BRAND MGr. 250, 250-51 (2005); see
also Henrik Sjddin & Fredrik Tom, When communication challenges brand associations: a frame-
specific brand beliefs is likely limited to the parent brand generally. Stated
differently, an extension has little or no impact on the brand in the context of
particular products. Thus, even if an extension affects consumers' general
view of the Neutrogena brand as "mild," it is unlikely to affect their belief
that Neutrogena hand lotion is mild.
This is true, generally speaking, regardless of how familiar the brand is
to consumers. Consumers are less motivated to process information about
less familiar brands, and unmotivated consumers tend to use a "sub-typing"
strategy, storing information about the atypical extension in a separate cog-
nitive category.'2 As a result, relatively unfamiliar brands are likely to be
insulated from feedback from incongruent extensions.
But this point appears generalizable: after reviewing the relevant litera-
ture to distill "main tendencies," Sjodin and Trn conclude that negative
evaluation of incongruent extension information will not affect evaluation of
the parent brand."'3 The authors explain this somewhat counterintuitive re-
sult by suggesting consumers generally use a sub-typing strategy to resolve
incongruous information.'l 4 But whether or not sub-typing explains the lack
of impact on familiar brands in addition to unfamiliar ones, Sjodin and
Thrn's conclusion that incongruous information is unlikely to impact parent
brands fits comfortably with other research demonstrating that that con-
sumer perceptions of well-known brands are quite resistant to change."' It
therefore seems unlikely that incongruence negatively impacts even well-
known brands. This likely explains why numerous cultural icons that lack
any trademark protection and are therefore free for use-Uncle Sam, the
Eiffel Tower, the Statue of Liberty, the Mona Lisa, Mount Rushmore, the
works of Shakespeare, and the characters Frankenstein (and his monster),
work for understanding consumer responses to brand image incongruity, 5 J. CONSUMER BEHAV.
32, 38 (2006).
112. Thorbjomsen, supra note 111.
113. Sjadin &Trn, supra note 111.
114. Id.
115. See Stephen J. Hoch, Product Experience Is Seductive, 29 J. CONSUMER REs. 448, 451
(2002) ("Using a simply associative learning procedure, [researchers] showed that, in a few trials,
people learn brand associations that later block the learning of new predictive attribute associa-
tions."). Even Jacob Jacoby, perhaps dilution's biggest proponent, admits that truly well-known
marks are essentially unshakable. Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution: Empirical
Measures for an Elusive Concept, 19 J. PuB. POL'Y & MARKETING 265, 274 (2000) ("It appears that
very strong brands are immune to dilution because their memory connections are so strong that it is
difficult for consumers to alter them or create new ones with the same brand name."). There is abun-
dant evidence outside the branding context of the robustness of initial judgments. See, e.g., Jon D.
Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipula-
tion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 646-54 (1999) (discussing a number of empirical demonstrations of
the persistence of initial judgments, even in the face of contradictory or ambiguous hard data). Even
conscious consumers who try to reason through additional information are unlikely to change their
perceptions; attempts at rationalization may actually serve to increase confidence in a faulty intui-
tive judgment, a phenomenon known as confirmation bias. See id. at 647-50, 660-62; Nicholas
Epley & Thomas Gilovich, The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic: Why the Adjustments are
Insufficient, 17 PSYCHOL. Sa. 311, 312 (2006) ("[Pleople evaluate hypotheses by trying to confirm
them.").
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Dracula, Scrooge, and King Arthur-nonetheless seem impervious to either
blurring or tarnishment from incongruous uses.16
Moreover, even if incongruous uses did impact a few moderately well-
known brands-those for which consumers would likely be highly moti-
vated to process information but which are not well known enough to be
impervious to change-consumers with high levels of involvement are less
likely to be confused by uses of a similar mark in the first place, or at least
are likely to be confused by different types of similarity than are consumers
in low-involvement situations. According to Howard, Kerin, and Gengler,
consumers in high-involvement situations are unlikely to be confused by
uses of a mark that is similar to the core mark in sight or sound, though rela-
tively more likely to be confused by uses of marks that are similar in
meaning.'17 Together these lines of research suggest both that consumers are
unlikely to be confused by similarity in circumstances of high involve-
ment,"' in which harm is most likely to follow from confusion, and that
confusion is unlikely to be harmful in those cases where confusion is more
likely.
Finally, any effect on consumers' specific brand beliefs is unlikely to
matter to purchasing decisions because evaluations of specific brand beliefs
generally don't impact consumers' decisions: consumers evaluating a new
product tend to rely on global attitudes towards a brand rather than attempt-
ing to recall and process specific brand attributes.
116. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71
U. CHI. L. REv. 129, 146 (2004); Justin Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked
Audience Interests, 77 'ITx. L. REv. 923, 961 (1999). For a discussion of the marketing literature on
why these well-known marks are essentially impervious to harm, see McKenna, supra note 7, at
105. A significant upshot of this conclusion is that the preemption and free-riding arguments are
particularly important in the context of well-known brands since the feedback arguments are even
weaker for those brands.
117. Daniel J. Howard et al., The Effects of Brand Name Similarity on Brand Source Confu-
sion: Implications for Trademarks Infringement, 19 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 250, 257-58
(2000). Even these findings are probably overstated. The authors of the study tested confusion by
showing participants a variety of goods, including two different bottles of drain cleaner and two
different containers of car wax. They varied the difference between the two brands such that the
second sometimes was similar in meaning (Hurricane vs. Cyclone) and sometimes in sound (Hurri-
cane vs. Hurri-Drain). The authors then measured confusion about common source by telling study
participants:
The first set of products you reviewed yesterday included a brand of drain cleaner (car wax).
The second set of products you just reviewed also included a brand of drain cleaner (car wax).
How likely or unlikely is it that those two brands of drain cleaner (car wax) were made by the
same company?"
Id. They then scored the responses on a seven-point scale ranging from "very likely" (1) to "very
unlikely" (7). This formulation likely led to overstated levels of confusion generally, since the ques-
tion seems to have primed respondents to consider common source. Confusion also was likely
overstated because the authors used the same trade dress for all the test objects (both drain cleaners,
for example). See id.
118. If Thorbjomsen is right that high familiarity correlates with higher involvement, see
Thorbjamsen, supra note 111, then it seems likely that consumers are less likely to be confused
about third-party uses that are similar to familiar brands only in sight or sound.
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The argument that mark owners are harmed by reputational feedback in
the context of pure sponsorship or affiliation relationships is even weaker."9
The most relevant information here comes from studies of negative spillover
from information about brand alliance partners.120 In one such study, Voto-
lato and Unnava focused on the consequences to a partner of negative
information about a supplier or a celebrity endorser of the partner's prod-
ucts.121 Specifically, the authors sought to measure the effect of information
that a fictitious clothing company's partners had behaved immorally or had
been incompetent on consumers' attitudes toward the company.122 There
wasn't any. The lesson is simple, if remarkable: negative information does
not have any feedback effect on the partner absent some additional informa-
tion about the partner's culpability for the failing. This is true regardless of
whether the information relates to competence or a moral failing and regard-
less of whether the information is about another company or a person with
which the partner is associated. The authors note:
[A] host brand may generally be quite impervious to negative publicity
surrounding its partner brand; the host brand [in the study] was only af-
fected when participants were led to believe that the host knew of and
condoned the partner's behavior. Spillover from the partner brand to the
host brand did not occur unless this condition was present. 123
We think these findings cast serious doubt on the assumption that con-
sumers will hold a mark owner responsible for the quality of unrelated
goods bearing the same mark even if they are confused about the mark own-
er's relationship with those goods. As a result, they call into serious question
119. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 8, at 416.
120. Brand alliances are "partnership[s] between two entities in which efforts are combined
for a common interest or to achieve a particular aim." Nicole L. Votolato & H. Rao Unnava, Spill-
over of Negative Information on Brand Alliances, 16 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 196, 196 (2006). Such
partnerships can take many forms, but the two most common forms are joint promotions (e.g.,
McDonald's using Kung Fu Panda toys in its Happy Meals) and co-branding arrangements (e.g.,
Edy's Loaded Cookie Dough Ice Cream with Nestle Toll House cookie dough).
121. Id. at 198.
122. Previous research suggested that consumers might react differently to different types of
negative information-information about competence, on the one hand, and moral misdeeds on the
other. Id. at 197 (citing Tom J. Brown & Peter A. Dacin, The Company and the Product: Corporate
Associations and Consumer Product Responses, 61 J. MARKETING 68 (1997); Bogdan Wojciszke et
al., Effects of Information Content and Evaluative Extremity on Positivity and Negativity Biases, 64
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 327 (1993)). Specifically, this earlier research suggested that
consumers react more negatively to competence-based information than moral failures when the
target of the information is a company; just the reverse is true when the target of the information is a
person. Id. at 197.
123. Id. at 201. These findings, as the authors also note, may help explain why spillover ef-
fects are not frequently reported in practice. Id. It is also worth emphasizing that respondents in this
study were told explicitly that the partner had a relationship with the third party about which the
negative information was provided. Thus, there was no ambiguity about affiliation-respondents
understood that the partner was affiliated with the third party. Hence, spillover is unlikely to occur
absent some information-additional information, beyond the mere fact of association-
demonstrating the host brand's specific culpability. In other words, as Votolato and Unnava note, the




the first-line argument that trademark owners are harmed by a defendant's
use of the same mark in another market.
B. Empirical Evidence Supports the Existence
of a Benefit to Junior Users
On the other hand, the available empirical evidence suggests that junior
users can benefit significantly from use of a known mark, and that junior
uses can sometimes impede a mark owner's own expansion. In other words,
known marks do sometimes add value to new products or services, and
third-party uses do sometimes affect expansion.
One branch of marketing literature attempts to study the conditions un-
der which information about the existing ("parent") brand transfers to a new
product offered under that brand, thereby reducing the costs of entry and
increasing the likelihood that consumers will accept the new product or ser-
vice. The effects these studies attempt to measure are spillover effects-that
is, they focus on the potential benefits accruing to a new product offered
under a known brand name rather than the effects on the brand name in its
original context. These studies therefore measure the expansion potential of
a brand and speak most directly to the arguments regarding free riding, as
they seek to identify when the junior use will benefit from goodwill associ-
ated with the senior use.
According to this literature, the success of any particular extension is
primarily a function of three factors: (1) the perceived quality of the core
brand; (2) the similarity or "fit" of the proposed extension with the family
(or core) brand; and (3) the perceived credibility of the family brand.24 Con-
sumers favorably evaluate extension products when the core brand is high
quality and they perceive the extension product as a good fit with existing
products.'2 Conversely, when an extension is not perceived as a good fit, the
goodwill associated with the core brand will not lead to favorable evalua-
tions of the extension products.
Fit in this context can be measured in terms of complementarity, substi-
tutability, and transferability. Complementarity refers to the extent to which
consumers view the extension product as a complement to the goods offered
by the parent brand. Products are complementary if both are consumed
124. See Kevin Lane Keller & David A. Aaker, The Effects of Sequential Introduction of
Brand Extensions, 29 J. MARKETING REs. 35, 47 (1992) (discussing the factors that contribute to a
successful brand extension).
125. While in one study Keller and Aaker found that extensions from high-quality brands may
be evaluated favorably even when they are somewhat more remote-that is, high-quality core brands
"stretch farther"-the relatively dissimilar products in that study were still quite close to those of-
fered under the core brand. See id. at 40-44 (testing extensions deemed close, medium, and far from
the core brand product, where ice cream was the "far" extension of a brand known for potato chips);
Sood & Keller, supra note 108.
126. Keller & Aaker, supra note 124, at 45.
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jointly to satisfy some particular need.127 For example, ski clothing is a com-
plementary extension for the ROSSIGNOL brand, which originally was
known for downhill skis.128 Substitutability refers to the extent to which con-
sumers view the extension product as a substitute for the goods offered by
the parent brand. Substitute products tend to have common applications and
use contexts such that one product could replace the other in usage and sat-
isfy the same needs.129 Cross-country skis or ice skates therefore would be
substitute extensions for ROSSIGNOL.so Finally, transferability relates to
the relevance of a brand owner's expertise in the extension product category.
Specifically, transferability depends on the extent to which consumers be-
lieve a parent brand owner can use its people, facilities, and skills to make
the new product or offer the new service."' Transferability is related to cre-
132
dibility, which is a function of perceived expertise and trustworthiness.
Extension products also benefit to the extent particular concrete or
abstract brand attribute associations transfer to the new product."' As Keller
and Aaker explain, "[e]xtension evaluations will depend primarily on
whether the specific attribute or benefit associations for the core brand are
viewed as relevant in the extension product category and, if so, how favor-
able those inferred associations are [in the context of the extension
product]." 34 Consumers may value a particular brand association highly in
one context but not in another, even when there is fit between the products
or services. Despite the similarity between products, for example, consum-
ers may value thickness in tomato-based juices but not in children's
fruit-flavored drinks.'35 Likewise, pulp is related to high quality in orange
juice but to low quality in apple juice.136 The extent to which particular
brand attribute associations transfer to the extension product therefore de-
pends "not only on the strength of association" with the parent brand, but
127. David A. Aaker & Kevin Lane Keller, Consumer Evaluations of Brand Extensions, 54 J.
MARKETING 27, 30 (1990).
128. Id.
129. Id. (discussing the importance of product classes when determining complements).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id. Perceived expertise and trustworthiness are highly correlated and may depend on
the perception of previous extensions. The effect of previous extensions on new extension evaluation
appears to depend more on the success of the previous extensions than the relative similarity of the
intervening extensions. Aaker and Keller found no differences in perceived credibility (and pre-
sumably in evaluations of proposed extensions) based on fit between an intervening extension and
the core brand. See id.
133. Keller & Aaker, supra note 124, at 36-37. Concrete brand attribute associations relate to
tangible product characteristics, and abstract brand attribute associations relate to intangible image
characteristics. Id.
134. Id.
135. Valarie A. Zeithaml, Consumer Perceptions of Price, Quantity, and Value: A Means-End




also on the "appropriateness of the association" in the new context and
"whether cues are present to activate an association."'
Importantly, all of these findings depend on the consumer connecting
the new extension to the original brand.' If the consumer does not believe
that the original trademark owner manufactured (or at the very least is partly
responsible for) the new extension, she will not attribute the characteristics
of the original brand to the extension. As a result, the evidence for benefits
to third parties from adopting an established brand from another market fre-
quently depends on evidence that consumers are actually confused about the
relationship between those brands. Indeed, in the studies we cite, there is no
ambiguity about source: subjects are told explicitly that the extensions come
from the brand owner or that the alliance actually involves particular brand
owners.
Moreover, the extent to which new products benefit from use of the
known mark depends substantially on the nature of the respective products
and how they are positioned in the marketplace. Whether global assessments
of a parent brand will benefit a new product depends on the nature of the
new product and its "fit" with the parent brand. And product characteristics
also determine whether many relevant brand attribute associations-like
thickness-will transfer to the new product. Thus, while it is undeniably
true that modem marketing focuses on brand identity and producers' ability
to create associations with a brand, it is also clear that the product or prod-
uct class to which the mark has been applied is a central component in the
meaning of a mark to consumers.
Cumulatively, this research suggests to us that a third party stands to
benefit from use of an established brand to offer a new product or service
when (1) consumers believe that the original brand owner makes or is
somehow responsible for the new product, (2) that new product or service is
perceived as a good fit with the brand owner's other products, and (3) par-
ticular brand attribute associations transfer to the new product from the old.
These benefits particularly redound to uses of brands believed to be high
quality. Hence, a third party that makes use of a known high-quality brand
to offer its own products may, in some cases, reap benefits from the associa-
tion with the established brand that it would not if it created its own new
brand.
A final way in which third parties might benefit from the use of a known
brand is by drawing on the emotional valence of that brand. Specifically,
consumers' familiarity with a brand may translate to an initial preference for
new goods bearing that mark, a preference that is independent of specific
brand attributes.139 This effect might be particularly pronounced in situations
of low involvement, where consumers lack motivation to process informa-
137. Aaker & Keller, supra note 127, at 29.
138. In the studies we report, the brand extensions are in fact made by the trademark owner,
not by unauthorized third parties.
139. See Laura R. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the Trademark Consumer, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1227, 1264-66 (2008).
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tion about the products with which they are confronted.'4 In those situa-
tions, consumers may simply rely on their familiarity with the known brand,
which will redound to the benefit of the junior user.
Brand alliance studies also confirm that certain alliances have synergis-
tic effects, positively affecting consumers' evaluations of the alliance
product or service in ways neither alliance partner could itself. Similar to
the lessons of the brand extension literature, these studies suggest that con-
sumers' evaluations of brand alliances depend on pre-existing attitudes
towards the alliance partners as individual entities (and particularly their
levels of perceived quality) and on the fit of the brands in the alliance.14'
Specifically, brands prove beneficial to a brand alliance if they can "signal
high quality cues that transfer to the other alliance brand, or provide infor-
mation on product attributes that benefits the alliance." 4 2 Indeed, "transfer
of perceived quality is enhanced when brands fit together." 43
Fit in the context of brand alliances, like in the brand extension context,
can relate to the types of products or services primarily associated with the
alliance partners or to brand personality characteristics.'" And fit in both
senses can enhance consumer evaluations of the alliance product or service.
Thus, according to one study, an alliance between Filofax and Sony to offer
an electronic personal organizer is better received by consumers than an
alliance between Filofax and Calvin Klein to offer the same product. 145 At
the same time, either of those alliances (Filofax and Sony or Filofax and
Calvin Klein) is likely to be better received than an electronic organizer of-
fered jointly by Calvin Klein and Vidal Sassoon, neither of which offers any
expertise in electronics.
C. Evidence of Market Preemption Through Restricted Expansion
A third-party use can directly preempt use of a mark in the later market
because it establishes priority in the junior user. If the brand owner was in
fact going to enter the market using the same brand name, it may now be
unable to do so. And as some of the research we discussed above indicates,
some uses can indirectly impact a brand owner's ability to expand by affect-
ing consumer perceptions of the parent brand such that, even if the brand
owner gets to a new market first, consumers are less likely to accept the
140. Id. It is worth emphasizing that while third parties benefit from the familiarity of the
known mark in these circumstances, that third party's very use may increase the brand's familiarity
and benefit the mark owner in its market as well. See McKenna, supra note 7, at 110-12.
141. Akshay R. Rao & Robert W. Ruekert, Brand Alliances as Signals of Product Quality, 36
SLOAN MGMT. REV. 87 (1994); Bernard L. Simonin & Julie A. Ruth, Is a Company Known By the
Company It Keeps? Assessing the Spillover Effects of Brand Alliances on Consumer Brand Atti-
tudes, 35 J. MARKETING REs. 30 (1998).
142. David 0. James et al., Does the Tail Wag the Dog? Brand Personality in Brand Alliance
Evaluation, 15 J. PRODUCT & BRAND MGMT. 173, 174 (2006).
143. Id. at 175.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 176.
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extension product or will be less attracted to it. These uses need not be nega-
tive in the sense that the products with which they are used are of poor
quality or carry offensive connotations. A junior use can hamper the brand
owner's ability to expand when the junior product fails,146 leading consumers
to evaluate later extensions more negatively than they otherwise might
have. 47 Or the junior use can interfere by affecting global beliefs about the
brand (e.g., the belief that Neutrogena products are "mild") and therefore
making certain other extensions less likely to be accepted by consumers.
Such effects on global brand beliefs, however, operate at an abstract lev-
el, and not in the context of the goods the parent previously offered.148 The
effect of an extension on specific brand beliefs also tends to be limited to the
parent brand in the abstract, but specific brand beliefs are less important for
extension purposes. Research suggests that consumers evaluating a new
product tend to rely on global attitudes toward a brand rather than attempt-
ing to recall and process specific brand attributes.149 Thus, any interference
with expansion would result primarily from those few cases in which a
third-party use negatively impacted global brand attitudes. And of course
any such impact wouldn't prevent product expansion entirely; it would
merely make it more difficult for the owner of a mark in one market to use
the same mark in other markets. Many companies in fact use entirely differ-
ent marks when they expand into new markets; nothing in the literature we
discuss suggests that a brand owner that sought to expand under a different
mark would be harmed at all by another company's use of the brand owner's
core mark in a different market.
D. Summary
In short, the available marketing evidence suggests several things. First,
the traditional claim of harm to trademark owners from noncompeting
uses-that consumers will attribute the poor quality of the defendant's
146. As we noted before, in Aaker and Keller's study, successful brand extensions increased
evaluations of later extensions and of the core brand itself, at least when the core brand was of aver-
age quality. Aaker & Keller, supra note 127, at 43 (also noting that successful extensions had no
impact on high-quality core brands).
147. Id. at 46; Erdem, supra note 107, at 347. Notably, while unsuccessful intervening exten-
sions affected consumer evaluations of future extensions, they did not affect evaluations of the core
brand. Keller & Aaker, supra note 124, at 46. And even this risk regarding future evaluations ap-
peared significant only for moderate-quality core brands. Unsuccessful extensions had no impact on
evaluation of extensions by high-quality brands. An interesting parallel finding was that an unsuc-
cessful extension, even when it affects credibility and prevents the core brand from expanding to
less similar products, does not appear to prevent the core brand from "backtracking" and later intro-
ducing a more similar extension. Id. at 48. This may be because subjects tended to find the core
brand owner equally credible even after receiving information about a brand extension they regarded
as a bad fit. Id. at 45.
148. See supra note I10.
149. See Girish N. Punj & Clayton L. Hillyer, A Cognitive Model of Consumer-Based Brand
Equity for Frequently Purchased Products: Conceptual Framework and Empirical Results, 14 J.
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 124, 125 (2004) (stating that consumers tend to rely predominately on atti-
tudes toward a brand when evaluating new products); see also Bradford, supra note 139.
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goods to the plaintiff, undermining the plaintiff's reputation-is not persua-
sive. Even when consumers do attribute the defendant's goods to the
plaintiff, they do not punish the plaintiff for perceived lapses in a different
market. Second, some uses can in fact interfere with a brand owner's own
potential use in a new market, either by getting to that market before the
brand owner or by making consumers less willing to accept certain exten-
sions, perhaps by giving those consumers a more negative initial impression
of the brand extensions. This might be seen as a disadvantage to brand own-
ers, but only if they were in fact going to enter that market using the same
name.'so And third, junior users can benefit from using the marks of an es-
tablished brand in a different market. In the next Part, we discuss the
implications these findings have for trademark law.
IV. EVALUATING CLAIMS TO OWN MARK(ET)S
We begin with the market preemption arguments that purport to fit with-
in the framework of producer harm. We then turn to claims that trademark
owners should be able to own mark(et)s themselves, appropriating any value
that can trace its origin to the mark or the mark owner. In the absence of
consumer injury, neither a claim that the producer has been injured in a
market in which it does not compete nor a claim that someone else has be-
nefited from using the mark provides a persuasive reason to hold a
defendant liable for trademark infringement.
A. Claims of Producer Harm
Once we have set aside cases in which consumers are confused about
the actual source or quality of the goods, the "injury" a trademark owner
suffers from the adoption of the same mark by another company for unre-
lated goods seems to be that it is more difficult for the trademark owner to
expand into new markets using the same mark. That difficulty can be a re-
sult of market preemption-the mark owner can't enter the same market as
the defendant with the same mark without causing confusion. It can also be
a more diffuse problem-consumers may react differently to brand exten-
sions in a third market if they have seen what they mistakenly believed were
extensions by the mark owner in other markets.
But merely because the trademark owner wants the ability to enter an
unrelated market using its "home" trademark doesn't mean it has a legal
right to do so. After all, many, perhaps most, trademarks are not unique;
mark owners frequently coexist with third parties that own the same mark in
other markets."' The question, then, is whether trademark law ought to pre-
fer a particular mark owner over a junior user in those cases in which the
150. Whether it is a legal injury is a question to which we turn in the next Part.
151. Among countless examples, consider Dell, United, American, Delta, Apple, Amazon,
and Visa (notwithstanding Judge Kozinski's claim in Visa Int'l that there is only one Visa). See Visa
Int'l Serv. Ass'n v. JSL Corp., 610 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2010).
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third party uses a mark in a way that does not suggest the mark owner is
responsible for the quality of the junior user's goods. More particularly, the
question is whether a senior user ought to have superior rights to use a mark
in ancillary markets because third-party use of the mark would interfere,
directly or indirectly, with the senior user's ability to enter other markets
under that mark.
It is an important question because extending trademark rights broadly
into unrelated markets has real costs. We detailed those costs in a prior pa-
per.152 Briefly, they include the generation of numerous legal conflicts
between marks that would otherwise coexist; the unsuitability of existing
legal frameworks to resolving those conflicts when not directed at tradi-
tional forms of confusion; the risk of actually increasing consumer
confusion by changing consumer beliefs about the role of brands; and the
chilling effect on speech about trademarks and trademark owners.' 3 Because
of these costs, we cannot be indifferent about the initial allocation of trade-
mark rights. Mark owners allocated broad trademark rights are likely to
exploit those rights to their specific benefit even if consumers and other
producers are hurt as a result. Nor can we blithely assume that parties will
simply bargain to reallocate rights when third parties value the use more
than the mark owner. Many socially valuable uses-such as parodies and
criticisms-are precisely those that trademark owners would never license.
And cognitive biases are likely to interfere even for those uses mark owners
ordinarily would be inclined to license. For one thing, mark owners tend to
be strongly attached to "their" marks, and as a result, the "endowment ef-
fect" is likely to be particularly pronounced here.154 Mark owners may also
be overly optimistic about their own ability to expand into ancillary mar-
kets.155
The claim of injury to trademark owners from the foreclosure of market
entry is circular. Because consumers have not been injured and trademark
owners have not suffered injury in their core markets, the difficulty mark
152. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 8, at 438-43.
153. Id.
154. The "endowment effect" refers to the difference in value people attach to goods when
they own them as compared to when they are considering purchasing them. People are reluctant to
part with their property, and as a result, the price at which they are willing to sell it generally far
exceeds the amount that others are willing to pay to acquire it. See Russell Korobkin, The Endow-
ment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1231-35 (2003). For a demonstration of
the endowment effect in the context of creative works, see Christopher J. Buccafusco & Christopher
Jon Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 91 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
2010).
155. See generally David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma
of Unrealistic Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT
334, 334 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) ("By a number of metrics and across a variety of do-
mains, people have been found to assign higher probabilities to their attainment of desirable
outcomes than either objective criteria or logical analysis warrants."). See also Christopher J. Bucca-
fusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1647009 (finding that creators substantially overvalue their




owners have in expanding their brands to new markets is a cognizable legal
harm if, but only if, trademark owners have a legal right to control the use of
their marks in unrelated markets. But that is precisely the question we are
trying to decide. To decide it, we must do more than simply assume the con-
clusion. We must explore the reasons we might want to grant or withhold
control over brand extensions. That debate-and the entire claim of pro-
ducer harm through market preemption-is bound up with the free-riding
arguments, to which we now turn.
B. Free Riding
The market preemption argument is a specific instance of a more general
claim: that trademark owners should control words or markets altogether, on
the theory that the defendant who uses a mark on unrelated goods, or who
makes goods that derive from the plaintiff's original market, is free riding
on the goodwill built up by the trademark owner. The claim is not that either
consumers or trademark owners are harmed by this free riding, except in the
circular sense that if the law allowed trademark owners to get paid for it
they would have made more money. Rather, the claim is that defendants
benefit from the use of the mark, the benefit is unjust, and so it should be
paid to the plaintiffs.
As we saw in Part III, there is some truth to the claim that a defendant
starting up can benefit from using an established brand name on unrelated
goods, although the likelihood and degree of the benefit depends on the con-
text of the use and how consonant it is with the image of the underlying
brand. And of course if a defendant hopes to sell goods based directly on the
plaintiff's mark-t-shirts featuring a cartoon character or a famous line from
a movie, for instance-it has little choice but to use the established character
or movie line. And despite the fact that characters and lines often will not
constitute trademarks, both types of uses are regularly swept within the
rubric of free riding on a plaintiff's mark.
"Unjust enrichment" is not redundant, however. The fact that defendants
are enriched by using the plaintiff's mark should begin the inquiry, not end
it. A defendant's enrichment is only unjust if there is some reason to believe
the value of a trademark in ancillary markets should belong to the plaintiff
in the first instance. The unjust enrichment rationale simply assumes that
156. Trademarks are devices used to brand goods; characters in a book usually don't serve
that purpose. Indeed, even titles of movies and books are generally not treated as trademarks unless
the title is common to multiple works in a series. See Herbko Int'l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308
F.3d 1156, 1162 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("While titles of single works are not registrable, they may be
protected under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act upon a showing of secondary meaning."); Sugar
Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 267-69 (5th Cir. 1999) (viewing single book titles as de-
scriptive of the contents, and requiring proof of secondary meaning); Estate of Jenkins v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 706, 710 (E.D. Va. 2000), aff'd, 7 F. App'x 270 (4th Cir. 2001)
("[T]itles of expressive works are treated differently from other trademarks, in that titles, even if
suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful, nonetheless require secondary meaning to receive trademark pro-
tection, while other suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks do not.").
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conclusion,5 7 and it therefore fails to provide a standalone explanation for
expanding trademark law.
The following sections look more closely at four theories of why a
trademark owner should own the value of a mark in ancillary markets. As
we demonstrate, none is terribly persuasive.
1. Preventing Consumer Confusion
The most straightforward reason to prevent defendants from using a
plaintiff's mark is that consumers are likely to be confused by the use in a
way that harms them. That last point is critical, however: it is not enough
that consumers misunderstand the relationship between the plaintiff's and
the defendant's goods. If that misunderstanding has no consequence for
consumers-if they are not hurt as a result-it is not something trademark
law should care about.158
The evidence we discussed in the previous section suggests that con-
sumers are actually quite sophisticated about brand extensions. They are
able to think of the extension separately from the underlying brand, and to
evaluate the quality of each independently. As a result, in the ordinary run of
cases, consumers are unlikely to be harmed by a defendant's use of a plain-
tiff's brand in an unrelated market. There may be circumstances, however, in
which consumers are confused to their detriment by an apparent brand ex-
tension. We think those circumstances are likely to be ones where the junior
use is sufficiently related to the mark owner's use that consumers are likely
to believe the mark owner is responsible for the quality of the junior user's
goods. If a defendant's confusing use of a plaintiff's mark actually injures
consumers, there is good reason for the law to prevent it.
It is worth emphasizing, however, that this is not in fact a theory of pro-
ducer harm or of free riding at all. In this set of cases, we enjoin the
defendant in order to protect consumers. We may also require defendants to
disgorge profits in some limited circumstances in order to deter intentional
deception.'" But any such disgorgement is a windfall to the trademark own-
er, who is unlikely to have suffered harm, not compensation for something
rightfully theirs.
2. Incentive Theory
The argument that a senior user of a trademark ought to have superior
rights to ancillary markets is troubling in a market economy because it pre-
supposes the right to control use of a mark in a market in which that mark
157. See William P. Kratzke, Normative Economic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 MEM. ST.
U. L. REv. 199, 223 (1991) (arguing that declaring competitive behavior to be "free riding" is a
conclusory epithet, not a workable economic principle).
158. We explain this in detail in our prior work. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 8, at 448-49.




owner does not compete. Such a right to control ancillary markets bears
striking resemblance to the derivative work right in copyright law. so
a. Incentives in Copyright Law
Precisely because such rights are departures from ordinary conceptions
of competition, they are usually justified in copyright law by the same sort
of incentive theory as copyright law as a whole.'6 ' According to Paul Gold-
stein, for example, the derivative work right "enables prospective copyright
owners to proportion their investment in a work's expression to the returns
expected not only from the market in which the copyrighted work is first
published, but from other, derivative markets as well.",1 Landes and Posner
similarly suggest that derivative rights increase the incentive to engage in
creative activities, encourage earlier publication of an original work by mak-
ing it unnecessary to withhold the publication in order to gain a lead time in
derivative markets, and reduce transactional costs by concentrating the con-
trol over derivative works on the copyright owner. To make it more
concrete, Landes and Posner suggest that an author will have greater incen-
tive to create (and the publisher greater incentive to distribute) the next great
American novel if the author or her publisher can prevent third parties from
creating a movie or a Broadway play based on the novel. Alternatively, con-
solidating the right to control follow-on works to the novel is sometimes
asserted to be more efficient.'6
These arguments are far from universally accepted even in copyright.
Scholars have argued, for example, that the derivative right is not necessary
to induce production of creative works because creators rely primarily on
returns from the original work itself to recover their costs.'6 ' And some have
160. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006) ("Subject to section 107 through 122, the owner of copy-
right under this title has the exclusive right[] ... (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work."). The Copyright Act defines a derivative work as "a work based upon one or
more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." Id. § 101.
161. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (noting that a
copyright is "intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a
special reward").
162. Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y 209, 216 (1983); see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 5.3 (2d ed. Supp. 2004) (repeating
the analysis).
163. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 325, 353-57 (1989).
164. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcON. 265,
275-76 (1977); see also F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REv. 697 (2001). For an explanation of why the commercialization argu-
ment falls short in intellectual property more generally, see Lemley, supra note 116, at 132-41.
165. Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1215-
16 (1996). Even Landes and Posner ultimately accept that the derivative right is not necessary to
give adequate incentives to create new works of authorship. Landes & Posner, supra note 163, at
354.
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argued that, whatever marginal incentive the derivative right provides-
particularly in light of courts' expansive construction of the reproduction
right-is outweighed by the costs of impeding vigorous competition for
works that build on an original work.' But the terms of the debate are more
or less accepted: derivative rights are evaluated under the same sort of utili-
tarian calculus as copyright law generally. Copyright law generally-and
the derivative works right in particular-intentionally reduce market compe-
tition in order to overcome a public goods problem that leads to the
underproduction of hard-to-create, easy-to-copy works.
b. Incentives to Create New Marks
It is hard to conceive of a similar public goods problem in trademark law
that would justify market allocation of noncompeting goods in incentive-
based terms. Whether or not we need to allocate additional markets to au-
thors and playwrights in order to motivate them to create books and plays, it
seems implausible to think that we need to award rights in words themselves
in order to motivate the creation and use of new trademarks. 6 9 The Fourth
Circuit once famously said that a reasonably smart person could come up
166. This criticism applies with almost equal force to many reproduction cases in which the
defendant is deemed to have copied despite having created a new work that differs significantly
from the original work.
167. There are some alternative accounts of the derivative right. See, e.g., Michael Abramo-
wicz, A Theory of Copyright's Derivative Right and Related Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REv. 317, 322
(2005) (arguing the derivative right "is best understood not solely as a means of furthering the in-
centive to create works, but more significantly as a means of providing an author control over the
release of adaptations and limiting the production of adaptations that would be close substitutes for
one another" and thereby reducing redundancy). But the only alternative account with any signifi-
cant traction is one based on moral rights. On that argument, the right to control derivative uses
flows from the author's interests in the integrity of her work. This is, as one of us has recognized, a
problematic justification even for the derivative right, not least because moral rights arguments
focus on authors, while the derivative right is alienable and therefore may well be held by someone
other than the author. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 Tx. L. REv. 989, 1031-34 (1997). And the moral rights argument would be particularly unper-
suasive in the trademark context, since moral rights are thought to derive from the intimate
connection an author has with her work. The "authors" of trademarks, which generally are corporate
entities, have no human dignity at stake when others use their marks. We discuss this moral claim in
more detail infra notes 180-192 and accompanying text.
168. Lemley, supra note 167, at 993-97.
169. See Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade
Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1200-01 (1948) (disapproving of cases in which "admiration for inno-
vation obscure[s] the soundness of rules designed to foster free and easy competition" and arguing
that "the only interests in trade symbols worth protecting are those against loss of sales or loss of
reputation"); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language In the
Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 397, 399 (1990) ("[T]here is little need to create eco-
nomic incentives to encourage businesses to develop a vocabulary with which to conduct
commerce."). This isn't to say that there aren't any reasons to want new trademarks-at the very
least, trademarks might create a placebo effect that enhances the effectiveness of certain products.
But the question is not whether we want new trademarks; it's whether we need protection to incen-
tivize their creation.
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with plenty of new marks in an afternoon's work. While that may over-
state the case-there is work that goes into proper branding-the effort
expended is hardly of the same order of magnitude as the creation of a new
movie, much less a new drug. Moreover, if we did think the incentive-to-
create theory motivated trademark law, we would probably design that law
rather differently, giving much more weight to creation and relatively less to
use as a central feature. And we would surely not allow firms to claim own-
ership rights in terms they didn't invent, but borrowed from others, like
Federated or American or United or National. 7 1
c. Incentives to Invest in Quality or Market Entry
To be sure, there is an incentive-based argument that is typically offered
in support of trademark law generally. Courts and commentators both fre-
quently suggest that trademark rights allow a producer to invest in the
quality of its goods or services, as "a firm with a valuable trademark would
be reluctant to lower the quality of its brand because it would suffer a capital
loss on its investment in the trademark."' 7 2 Hence, "legal protection of
trademarks encourages the production of higher-quality products.""' On this
account, trademark rights don't themselves create the incentives. Market
competition provides plenty of incentive to brand and distinguish one's
170. Ambrosia Chocolate Co. v. Ambrosia Cake Bakery, 165 F.2d 693, 697 (4th Cir. 1947)
("[A] man of ordinary intelligence could easily devise a score of valid trade-marks in a short period
of time.").
171. This might mean granting trademark rights to the marketing firms that thought up the
brand names. rather than to the companies that used them. Even more certainly, we would not en-
dow companies with ownership of marks created by the public, as many courts have. See Nat'l
Cable Television Ass'n v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("Moreover, even without use directly by the claimant of the rights, the courts and the Board gener-
ally have recognized that abbreviations and nicknames of trademarks or names used only by the
public give rise to protectable rights in the owners of the trade name or mark which the public modi-
fied. Such public use by others inures to the claimant's benefit and, where this occurs, public use
can reasonably be deemed use 'by' that party in the sense of a use on its behalf.") (footnote omit-
ted); see also Johnny Blastoff, Inc. v. L.A. Rams Football Co., 188 F.3d 427, 434 (7th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Nat'1 Cable Television, 937 F.2d at 1577); Volkswagenwerk AG v. Hoffman, 489 F. Supp.
678, 681 (D.S.C. 1980) (recognizing VW's rights in "Bug" based on public usage of the nickname
without VW's protest); Coca-Cola Co. v. Busch, 44 F. Supp. 405, 407 (E.D. Pa. 1942) (finding the
public use of "Coke" to refer to Coca-Cola's soft drink sufficient to create rights for Coca-Cola in
that term); Am. Stock Exch., Inc. v. Am. Express Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. 356, 362-64 (T.T.A.B. 1980)
(attributing to American Express rights in "AMEX" based on public use of that designation to de-
note American Express); Norac Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. 306, 315
(T.T.A.B. 1977) (earlier use of "OXY" by public determined priority); Pieper v. Playboy Enters.,
179 U.S.P.Q. 318, 320 (T.T.A.B. 1973) (recognizing Playboy's rights in "Bunny Club").
172. Landes & Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, supra note 15, at 270.
173. LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW,
supra note 15, at 179; Ariel Katz, Beyond Search Costs: The Linguistic and Trust Functions of
Trademarks, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REv. (forthcoming). It would be more accurate to state that protection
of trademarks encourages production of products with consistent quality, rather than high quality.
While it is true that trademark protection allows a mark owner the opportunity to reap the benefits of
investments in quality-since consumers will know who to credit for that quality-how much any
particular mark owner actually invests in quality depends on the position of the relevant goods or




goods. Trademark law merely preserves business incentives by making sure
the party in control of the quality of the goods gets appropriate credit or
blame for that quality. This is a critical distinction between trademarks and
the rest of IP law. Patents and copyrights are government efforts to interfere
with the operation of the market, skewing production away from what
would happen in a competitive economy in hopes of enhancing social wel-
fare. Trademark law, by contrast, is not designed to create above-market
incentives, but to ensure that the competitive market functions well.
Further, this traditional incentive-based argument for trademark law is
not an argument for granting rights for the purpose of preventing market
preemption, nor is it an argument particularly focused on ancillary markets.
Indeed, the argument makes much more sense in the context of competing,
or at least closely related, goods. If a company is not producing goods in a
market or actively considering entering that market, it has no reputation to
protect in that market, and there are no goods whose quality might be influ-
enced. And the derivative works rationale surely doesn't justify an anti-free-
riding impulse. The fact that an unrelated company in an unrelated market
benefits from using the same mark as me doesn't reduce my incentive to
make high-quality products in any way.
Incentive-based arguments for trademark protection must therefore fo-
cus on any possible feedback that the sale of unrelated products bearing the
same mark might have on consumers' perceptions of the trademark owner's
core product, and hence on its incentives to maintain the quality of that
product. We agree it would be a problem if trademark law were structured in
a way that had negative effects on these incentives. But we think it is impor-
tant to think carefully about the scope of trademark protection that is
necessary to preserve these incentives. First, the available empirical evi-
dence suggests that consumers are very unlikely to alter their perceptions of
the quality of a core brand based on negative information about noncompeti-
tive goods offered under the same mark.7 4 And if the image of the core
product is intact, the trademark has served its quality-protection function.
Even in the few cases in which the poor quality of an unrelated good
might affect consumers' views of a brand, mark owners should have suffi-
cient reason to invest in quality under a trademark system that affords a
claim against uses that imply control over quality. The quality of any prod-
uct that is sufficiently remote, such that use of the same mark causes no
confusion about who is responsible for the quality of the product, won't be
attributed to the mark owner. Hence, the mark owner has no reputation for
quality at stake.
We can imagine a few cases in which the prospect of being able to con-
trol ancillary markets could affect the quality of a mark owner's goods in its
core market even though consumers don't penalize the mark owner for the
quality of the goods in those ancillary markets. But for this story to hold, we
would have to believe that a trademark owner planned to expand into sepa-
rate markets hoping for additional returns from doing so, and that the mark
174. McKenna, supra note 7, at 115.
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owner wouldn't invest enough in product quality in its core market unless
we give it those returns. We are skeptical that this often happens in practice
outside of specialized contexts like Disney, which produces movies with one
eye on the marketing tie-ins they will create. But even if it does happen, it
doesn't follow that trademark law should encourage it. Trademark law is
designed to ensure that consumers can draw the right connection between
the product and its maker, so that they understand the quality of the products
they are buying. Allowing a trademark owner to capture spillovers in other
markets distorts that relationship. Companies who try to build up a core
brand in hopes of parlaying it into sales elsewhere are actually overinvesting
in product quality in the core brand, hoping to use that investment to capture
rents in a different market. It is as though we took one and only one area of
the economy-say, carpentry-and gave out lottery tickets to carpenters.
More people would become carpenters (and fewer people would go into
other professions of equal worth) because they were offered an additional,
government-provided bonus found nowhere else.
Nor do we think broader trademark rights are necessary to preserve in-
centives to enter new markets, even assuming we want to encourage such
entry. The current trademark infringement paradigm grants mark owners
claims against any uses likely to confuse consumers about who is responsi-
ble for the quality of the goods at issue, and mark owners therefore have
sufficiently robust protection to prevent against wasted investments prepar-
ing to enter closely related markets. We can, however, imagine
circumstances in which a mark owner should not have to take the chance.
The risk here would materialize only in cases in which a mark owner is ac-
tively preparing to enter a new market under its existing brand, but that new
market is sufficiently remote from the brand owner's core market that con-
sumers are not likely to believe the brand owner is currently responsible for
the quality of any third party's goods.
The most likely set of cases are those in which the preparation is pub-
licly known and is of sufficient importance to attract attention from those
who seek to divert consumer attention. For example, sports teams that
change cities or names, or build new stadiums, may invite such rent seek-
ing.'" And large companies that plan to expand abroad often find their
marks in the hands of so-called "trademark pirates." In those cases, the
brand owner stands to risk its investments preparing to enter the new market
if another party can enter the market and establish priority there.
This is, in our view, the best justification for an intent-based registration
option.'76 And we think the intent-to-use system is the best way to deal with
these circumstances. In fact, we think a mark owner should not be able to
simply assert a trademark infringement claim against a junior user in these
175. See Md. Stadium Auth. v. Becker, 806 F. Supp. 1236 (D. Md. 1992) (deciding a case in
which the owner of the new stadium of the Baltimore Orioles, Camden Yards, brought a trademark
infringement action against a vendor that used the "Camden Yards" mark on t-shirts and clothing
items).
176. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (2006) (permitting applications to register on the basis of a
"bona fide intention" to use a trademark in commerce).
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contexts and try to prove its preparations to enter the market. Instead, a
mark owner that wants protection of its investment should have to file the
intent-based application to signal a real investment in entering the new mar-
ket.'77 But if a party does file an ITU application, the law should treat that
party as senior to any other party that subsequently makes actual use, even
though the applicant was actually the later entrant into the market."' And
indeed courts generally find a way to achieve that result, though sometimes
through the problematic rhetoric of free riding.79
d. Incentives to Invest in the Brand
An alternative incentive-based argument might focus on a mark owner's
incentive to invest in the brand itself-particularly in the brand's personality
or "atmospherics." This is a more controversial argument because it isn't
clear we want to encourage greater investment in brands themselves. Several
scholars have suggested such investments can be wasteful, as they may en-
courage "irrational" brand loyalty and create barriers to entry. But even
assuming for the sake of argument that we do want mark owners to invest at
least to some degree in their brands above and beyond their investment in
the goods they represent, we think the value the mark owners can realize in
their core markets gives them ample incentive to do so. Marketing research
suggests that most consumers categorize marks in terms of their product
categories and that brand personalities distinguish brands within their mar-
kets. And while it's true that some aspects of a brand image play a role in
determining the likelihood a particular extension will be accepted by con-
sumers, the payoff from investments in the brand should generate sufficient
returns in a mark owner's primary market to make such investments worth-
177. See Aycock Eng'g, Inc. v. Airflite, Inc., 560 F.3d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (declining
trademark protection based on mere potential to create a competing product); RealNetworks, Inc v.
QSA ToolWorks, LLC, No. C07-1959MJP, 2009 WL 2512407, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 14, 2009)
("A party may not allege trademark protection or confusion based on its potential to develop a com-
peting product.").
178. We think a similar efficiency-based argument can be made regarding the registration
system more generally, particularly the nationwide priority feature. To begin with, many geographic
expansions don't need a market preemption or free-riding justification because consumers are likely
to believe that the Crate and Barrel store opening in their town is run or controlled by the national
Crate and Barrel chain. But even when consumers in the new geographic market might not be famil-
iar with the mark owner, registration enables that mark owner to make the necessary investments to
expand without worrying those investments will be lost. But here, too, we think parties that want to
claim priority beyond their actual use should have to actually file for a registration as a signal of real
investment. And we think the Dawn Donut rule plays an important role in limiting the extent to
which such registrations actually preempt remote geographic uses. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's
Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959) (refusing to enjoin geographically remote use absent
likely consumer confusion even when the plaintiff had a federal registration).
179. Cf Md. Stadium, 806 F.Supp. at 1241 (finding liability despite the fact that the plaintiff
wasn't in the market because of worries about free riding).
180. See Brown, supra note 169, at 1181-83; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies,
48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999); cf Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH.




while. Moreover, a trademark infringement standard that focuses on respon-
sibility for quality will generate rights broader than just directly competitive
uses.
Having said this, we concede it's possible that refusing to protect a mark
against some uses outside the control-over-quality range we have advocated
will somewhat reduce the incentive to invest in this brand "personality." But
we think that whatever incentive is created by this incremental difference in
scope is small, particularly since third-party uses in ancillary markets can
also benefit mark owners by making their marks more familiar and therefore
more likeable. Such a small incentive effect clearly doesn't warrant the costs
of expanding trademark protection. As we explained in our prior work, those
costs are substantial: claims to own rights in noncompeting goods are harder
to evaluate, interfere with free speech and social dialogue, and may actually
make consumers more rather than less confused. And it is no accident that
those costs are at their greatest precisely in the cases in which the incentive
story is at its weakest.
3. Accession and Default Ownership
Some argue that defendants should be prevented from using a mark be-
cause, even if the producer is not harmed by that use, someone must own the
right to use the mark in ancillary markets, and the trademark owner has a
better claim than anyone else. This argument finds its origin in property the-
ory and is primarily concerned with the disposition and use of real property.
Tom Merrill has argued that the real-property principle of accession justifies
assigning certain intellectual assets to someone, and that the logical owner is
the one "most prominently connected" to the asset-the person who can
make the highest and best use of the property.182
One of us has elsewhere criticized the effort to fit IP into the rubric of
property, pointing out that doing so often ends up warping IP rules because
the nature of intangible property is so different than the nature of real and
chattel property around which property doctrines were built. The idea of
accession seems to us a perfect case in point. The principle of accession is a
way of allocating rights in new property-land that has been deposited on a
181. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 8, at 439-45.
182. Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, I J. LEGAL ANALYSIs 459
(2009). To be clear, Merrill argues from the principle of accession, which he regards as a general
principle of property allocation. This is not to be confused with the doctrine of accession, which is
only one doctrine among many Merrill identifies as flowing from the principle of accession. See id.
at 465-66. In addition to the doctrine of accession (which deals with mistaken improvers of personal
property), Merrill identifies the doctrine of increase (which awards offspring to the owner of the
mother), the doctrine of accretion (which provides a riparian landowner whose land is gradually
augmented by alluvial formations ownership of the new land), and even the ad coelurn doctrine
(which declares that the owner of surface land owns from the depths to the sky) as examples of the
principle of accession. See id. at 7-12.
183. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tx. L. REv. 1031
(2005); see also Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 Hous. L. REv. 621, 623 (2003)
("The only point I want to emphasize is that the free riding that creates a need for IP law is eco-
nomically distinct from that involved in the theft of tangibles.") (emphasis added).
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river bank, for instance, or fixtures and other improvements that have been
attached to land by someone other than the owner of that land.' The under-
lying presumption-as it seems to be with real property in general-is that
someone must own the new asset, and the owner of some existing, nearby
asset-the owner of existing land to which the new land is attached, for ex-
ample-seems the most natural choice, particularly since divided ownership
of attached things creates its own set of problems.'
Whether or not the presumption that all property must be owned makes
sense for land or other tangible property-and there are some important
reasons to question it" -it certainly doesn't make sense for IP.' Patent and
copyright law not only permit but affirmatively demand that the residuum of
ideas and creations remains unowned, free for all to use. This public domain
does not lead to a "tragedy of the commons," as some have argued an analo-
gous commons would in the physical world,"' for the simple reason that
consumption of ideas is non-rivalrous." And while it's true that the value of
that new asset may be partly rivalrous,'M the rivalry of value generally does
not warrant assigning exclusive control. There is substantial, and rivalrous,
value in an exclusive right to operate in any market, but we ordinarily prefer
that value be shared by competitors, who create consumer welfare through
their competition. In a market economy it is not reasonable to simply as-
184. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *404-05; Earl C. Arnold, The Law
ofAccession of Personal Property, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 103, 118 (1922).
185. See, e.g., MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK EcONOMY (2008); Michael A. Heller, The
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, Ill HARv. L. REV.
621, 623-24 (1998).
186. For critiques of the claim that real property must be owned, see, for example, ELINOR
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1990); Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management,
89 MINN. L. REV. 917 (2005); and Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce,
and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 720-21 (1986).
187. For critiques of this assumption, see Dogan & Lemley, supra note 41, at 478-81 (critiqu-
ing unjust enrichment justification for merchandising rights in the trademark context); Lemley,
supra note 116, at 144-47; and Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Fitting Publicity Rights into Intellec-
tual Property and Free Speech Theory: Sam, You Made the Pants Too Long!, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J.
ART & ENT. L. 283, 307-4)8 (2000).
188. E.g., Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sa. 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
189. This may well be why, notwithstanding the ancient pedigree of many of the doctrines on
which Merrill focuses, and grounding of the principle of accession in the writings of early English
writers like Hume and Blackstone, early IP law, and particularly early trademark law, recognized
nothing like a principle of accession. Derivative rights were not recognized by copyright law, and
the right of reproduction was interpreted much more narrowly than it is now. And this was not be-
cause authors didn't recognize the potential value of broader rights-copyright did not extend to
translations, for example, even though translations were widely used and clearly contemplated by
authors and the creators of the copyright system. And trademark rights also were traditionally much
narrower, explicitly limited to directly competing uses. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative
Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839 (2007).
190. May, but not must. We can think of plenty of examples in which simultaneous use of an




sume that someone must own the right to compete in particular ways.'9 ' As
one of us has noted:
It is true that if we gave only one person control over a particular [trade-
mark], that person would restrict the [use of that trademark], raise its price,
and make more money than providers do in a competitive market. But so-
ciety as a whole would be worse off, since buyers who could afford to pay
more than what it costs to provide the information still would not receive
it.19
In other words, exclusive rightsholders prevent dissipation of the value of
exclusivity by acting like monopolists, complete with the requisite supra-
competitive prices. "But that supracompetitive return is not found money; it
comes directly out of consumer surplus. And basic economics teaches us
that what the owner gains from exclusive control is less than what consum-
ers lose."'93 Absent some offsetting consideration-like material consumer
confusion-there is no reason to accept this outcome.
If we really believed the principle of accession ought to be applied to
trademarks-that someone must own them, and that ownership should entail
control of use in ancillary markets-there is no reason to stop with existing
marks that have already acquired goodwill. We could parcel out ownership
rights to every word in the English language to different claimants, by lot-
tery or auction, and record those words in a registry so everyone would
know with whom they needed to deal to use the words. The fact that we
don't-that the whole idea seems ludicrous-is pretty good evidence that
words are not like land when it comes to ownership.
Moreover, even if we were to accept that someone must own the right to
use a trademark in a particular ancillary market, it's not clear why we would
give ownership of the term ("Exxon" as applied to gloves, for example) to
the first user of that mark in a different market (Exxon Oil company) rather
than the first user in the new market (the company that had first used the
term for gloves). Indeed, trademark law has always assumed the opposite:
trademark rights are awarded on the basis of first use of a mark in a particu-
lar geographic and product market.
191. As Ralph Brown put it, "Competition is copying." Ralph S. Brown, The Joys of Copy-
right, 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 477, 481 (1983); see also Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to Copy, 108
YALE L.J. 1661, 1661 (1999) ("[L]aws that restrain copying ... restrain competition."). See gener-
ally Peter Jaffery, Merchandising and the Law of Trade Marks, 3 INTELL. PRop. Q. 240 (1998)
(noting that trademark law does not support a general merchandising right).
192. Lemley, supra note 116, at 144.
193. Id. at 145.
194. See Lanham Act of 1946 § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006) (prohibiting "reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark"); MccARTHY, supra note 76, § 2:9, at
2-16 to -18. The first-use rule has historical pedigree. See Am. Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co.,
103 F 281, 287 (6th Cir. 1900) ("It is the party who uses [a designation] first as a brand for his
goods, and builds up a business under it, who is entitled to protection, and not the one who first
thought of using it on similar goods, but did not use it. The law deals with acts, not intentions.")
(quoting George v. Smith, 52 F. 830, 832 (C.C.N.Y 1892)).
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Accession, as Merrill acknowledges, is an alternative to first possession,
and the case for preferring it over first possession depends on a determina-
tion that the party to whom the asset is assigned is the most prominently
connected to the asset.'95 Prominent connection, if it can be reliably deter-
mined, is important to Merrill both because it serves as a proxy for being a
competent manager of the asset and because it appears to lower the cost of
determining who owns the asset so that coordination can take place.' 7 But
information costs are not really at stake here, because as trademark law has
long recognized, first use of a mark in a particular market is generally a suf-
ficiently clear indication of ownership. And the only cases in which we may
have reason to believe the senior user is a more competent manager of a
mark are those in which the junior use is for relatively closely related prod-
ucts where the quality signal conveyed by a mark might be meaningful. Yet
those are precisely the cases in which our approach to infringement-
focusing on responsibility for quality-would already extend protection.
Outside of those cases there is no reason to suspect that the senior user is a
better, more competent manager of the asset. Indeed, we might well assume
the opposite: by getting to a new market first, a junior user might be thought
to have demonstrated superior foresight or greater ability to exploit that new
market.
Nor is there any reason to fear costly races in the trademark context. De-
velopment of trademark rights in a new market entails relatively little
investment because the amount of use necessary to trigger trademark rights
is small. And while there are costs in developing new branding, those costs
by definition are reduced if the mark has already been created.
In the end, the persuasiveness of accession depends on whether we think
there is any harn to the "overuse" of a mark in an unrelated market in a way
that does not confuse consumers about the source or quality of the goods
being sold. As we have seen, the evidence of such harm simply isn't there.
The only "injury" the trademark owner can be said to suffer is a possibly
reduced ability to use the same mark in an entirely different market. But that
is an injury only if we define the scope of the trademark owner's legal enti-
tlement to include control over those markets. The idea of accession doesn't
help here, because it assumes the conclusion-that someone must own the
right to use a term across all markets.
195. Merrill, supra note 182, at 482-88.
196. This is a big "if." Merrill does not identify a principle by which this decision is to be
made; rather, he more or less simply asserts that "[a]ccession . . . awards ownership based on sta-
tus-the status of owning something prominently connected to the disputed object" Id. at 481. But
what is connected to what? Merrill argues that certain solutions have a "natural" prominence and
that ownership runs from ownership of "big" things to "small" things. Merrill, supra note 182, at
25-26. But in the trademark context, it isn't obvious that use in one market is "bigger" or more
valuable than the use in another market.
197. Id. at 482-93.
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4. Natural Rights and the Property Instinct
Another possible argument for such broad rights is that trademark own-
ers have some natural right not just to use their mark to brand their goods,
but to prevent others from similarly branding unrelated goods, or even from
selling goods that draw their market in part from the allure of something the
plaintiff has created. The instinct here is one Rochelle Dreyfuss has derided
as "if value, then right"': there is value to the use of a mark on unrelated
goods, and so the trademark owner deserves that value. This type of argu-
ment increasingly shows up in scholarly commentary about trademarks. 99
The natural rights argument is striking because trademark law in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth century was frequently justified in natural rights
terms-and courts that relied on natural rights principles created signifi-
cantly narrower rights than modem trademark law recognizes.2
Specifically, courts relying on a natural rights theory of trademark rights
strictly limited trademark rights to markets in which the mark owner ac-
tively competed. They did so because, while they aimed to protect the fruits
of a producer's honest labor by preventing competitors from stealing its
trade,201 they also felt compelled to avoid interfering with the rights of others
to develop their own trade.2 02 Courts distinguished between legitimate and
illegitimate diversions of the mark owner's trade by focusing on deception.
Indeed, this distinction is critical to understanding why trademark infringe-
ment was grouped with other forms of unfair competition: competition was
an essential element of the claim, and courts gave content to the "unfair"
component by distinguishing between honest and dishonest actions. Use in
198. Dreyfuss, supra note 169, at 405; see also Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and
the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 815 (1935) (noting the circularity inherent in this
argument).
199. See, e.g., David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of
the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in American Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117, 140-42 (2004);
Swann & Davis, supra note 89, at 276-77; Corina I. Cacovean, Note, Is Free Riding Aided by Par-
ody to Sneak Between the Cracks of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act?, 31 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 441, 458-59 (2009).
200. For a detailed description of that natural rights theory and its application to traditional
trademark law, see McKenna, supra note 189, at 1873-95.
201. See, e.g., Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tenn. Mfg. Co., 138 U.S. 537, 546 (1891) (describing a
mark owner's interests as "the custom and advantages to which the enterprise and skill of the first
appropriator had given him a just right," which is infringed when it is "abstracted for another's use
... by deceiving the public, by inducing the public to purchase the goods and manufactures of one
person supposing them to be those of another"); Wolfe v. Barnett, 24 La. Ann. 97, 99 (1872) (noting
that the leading principle of the law is to secure to the "honest, skillful and industrious manufacturer
or enterprising merchant ... the first reward of his honesty, skill, industry or enterprise" and protect
him from deprivation at the hands of another who "appropriates and applies to his productions the
same or a colorable imitation of the same name, mark, device or symbol, so that the public are, or
may be, deceived or misled into purchase of the productions of the one, supposing them to be those
of the other" (quoting FRANCIS H. UPTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE MARKS, WITH A
DIGEST AND REVIEW OF THE ENGLISH AND AMERICAN AUTHORITIES 97 (1860))).
202. See, e.g., Avery & Sons v. Meikle & Co., 81 Ky. 73, 102 (1883) (referring to "that great
generic rule which lies at the foundation of all law, that a man must so use his own property as not
to injure the property of another").
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different markets wasn't dishonest because consumers could not be tricked
by those uses into buying one product believing it to be another.203
Modem natural rights arguments seek something much different-broad
ownership of a mark independent of any particular market on the theory the
senior user owns any value attributable to the mark. And here the argument
is not simply disconnected from history; it loses its conceptual coherence.
Natural rights theories-at least those that don't depend directly on the will
of a god-grant property rights on the basis of productive use of an asset,
and courts operating in the natural rights tradition viewed customer patron-
age as the relevant asset in which a producer had a property interest.
Trademark rights therefore existed solely for the purpose of preventing
competitors from luring away a producer's customers by misrepresenting
themselves as the mark owner. Whatever one's view of the natural rights
theory generally, customer patronage is much more obviously the result of a
mark owner's productive labor than is a trademark itself, and uses of the
mark by direct competitors to divert customers who otherwise would have
gone to the mark owner are much more clearly interfering with that produc-
tive labor. The value modem natural rights arguments seek to protect is a
much broader brand value, and substantially less of that value is clearly at-
tributable to the mark owner. Indeed, in many of the cases in which this
argument would have significance, the uses at issue draw on the mark's val-
ue as a social referent-value created largely by the public.2
If we did think that the use of a word-or control over a market-in fact
belonged as a matter of right to the person who created its value, it is not
obvious to us that the rightful owner would be the company that first used
the mark in an unrelated context rather than the first user of that mark in the
new market. (Remember that natural rights are here being used to justify
ownership of the mark for unrelated goods, not simply for goods on which
the first user has actually used the mark.) In other IP contexts, advocates of
a natural rights theory offer it in order to justify conferring rights on authors
or inventors, not on record companies or semiconductor manufacturers.205
The fact that trademark law expressly protects companies, not individuals,
also makes a natural rights theory seem out of place, at least to the extent
that theory arises from claims of desert based on individual dignity.
Finally, if we did accept a natural rights theory of trademark law, trade-
mark doctrine would look radically different than it does today. Trademark
law has long countenanced simultaneous use of the same or similar marks in
203. And it's not as if courts never considered the question of whether trademark rights
should extend to noncompeting goods. Even in those different commercial times, mark owners
sought protection of their marks outside their own markets, only to be consistently turned away by
courts. See, e.g., Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 514 (7th Cir.
1912).
204. Cf Deborah R. Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in Trademarks, 88 N.C. L. REv. 427,
449-67 (2010) (noting the important role consumers play in determining which brands succeed in a
world in which eight out of ten brands fail).
205. See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American
Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1985).
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different product and geographic markets. But if the adoption of a mark
were to confer on its adopter a natural right to control the word in other
markets, that coexistence would become problematic. Every mark would
have to be unique, or at least so insulated from any other that the users
wouldn't share consumers. A natural rights approach would similarly sweep
away the likelihood of consumer confusion test that lies at the heart of
trademark law, since a defendant would run afoul of the first user's rights
whether or not consumers were confused. After all, natural rights are being
used here precisely to justify ownership of a mark in circumstances in which
consumers are not materially confused by a use. The hierarchy of mark pro-
tection would probably have to go as well: if I have a natural right to my
mark once I create it, it is not clear why it should matter what market I use it
in, and whether it is descriptive, suggestive, or arbitrary in that market. On
the other hand, if creation is the act that imbues a mark with its natural
rights, perhaps trademark law should protect only fanciful marks, as those
are the only marks that are really created. Either way, the protectability
spectrum doesn't seem to mesh with a natural rights approach. Nor do de-
fenses such as functionality, abandonment, nominative use, and certainly not
genericide. 206 If I own the mark, politicians, newspapers, and parodists
should have just as much obligation to refrain from using it as companies
who sell products in different markets under that mark. After all, they are
profiting from the use of the mark, generally far more directly than is a
company in a different market that happened to adopt the same name. So,
too, are gas stations and stores that deliberately locate across the street from
their branded competitors,207 and for that matter ordinary consumers who
208
use a brand as shorthand in conversation.
The problem is that an a priori decision to define the scope of a legal en-
titlement can easily be an arbitrary one unless it is tied to some sort of social
welfare calculus. We could have given the inventor of the steamboat (whom-
ever that turned out to be)209 a potentially perpetual legal right to prevent the
making of steamboats that worked the same way, or a legal right to prevent
206. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (requiring cancellation of marks for abandonment, functionality,
and genericide); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 218-21 (3d Cir.
2005) (establishing the nominative use defense in that circuit).
207. This seems to be a universal practice, not just one engaged in by discounters. See Deven
Desai, Why Do Competitors Set Up Shop Near Each Other?, MADISONIAN.NET, Dec. 21, 2009,
http://madisonian.net/2009/12/21/why-do-competitors-set-up-shop-near-each-other/; see also Eric
Goldman, Brand Spillovers, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 381, 384-97 (2009) (describing retailers' ubiq-
uitous practice of capitalizing on brand spillovers yet avoiding trademark liability).
208. While one of us has argued that trademark law should apply only to defendants who use
the mark as a brand, Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through
Trademark Use, 92 IowA L. REV. 1669 (2007), a category that would exclude ordinary consumers,
that argument has not carried the day, see, e.g., Rescuecom v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir.
2009) (finding that a search engine engaged in "trademark use" by permitting companies to run ads
opposite search results).
209. For a brief history of the competing claims to steamboat patents, see, for example, Dotan
Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on IP: A New Reading, 57 UCLA L. REv. 421, 449-50




the making of any steamboats, or a legal right to prevent the making of any
transportation devices that relied on steam power, or a legal right to prevent
the making of any transportation devices that relied on any machine for
power.2 0 Similarly, we could decide a priori that trademarks confer only
rights to prevent competing uses, or rights to prevent competing and analo-
gous uses, or rights to prevent all commercial uses, or rights to prevent all
uses of any type, including use of the word in conversation. Saying "some-
one must (or deserves to) own this," even if true, doesn't help answer the
question of who should own it and what the scope of their ownership right
should be. Those questions can be answered only by resort to social welfare.
Absent a reason to believe the world would be a better place if we created a
new property right, the fact that it is a property right is no reason to do so.
And the only plausible reason that has been offered to protect trademarks is
to protect consumer perceptions and prevent mistaken purchasing decisions.
In short, it is hard to credit some sort of pre-existing natural entitlement
to a trademark. And even if we did credit it, it wouldn't justify trademark
law in anything like its current form.
How, then, to explain the seemingly universal instinct that free riding is
bad and must be stopped? We begin by questioning the universality of that
instinct. People react to the sale of t-shirts bearing university logos as free
riding, but seem to have no similar objection to Little League teams adopt-
ing the names of professional baseball clubs. People who think companies
should be entitled to control uses of a common English word like "apple" in
markets entirely removed from computers and phones see nothing wrong
with a gas station deciding to locate across the street from a competitor. The
instinct, in other words, seems to be contingent-dependent not on the eco-
nomic facts of a use but on how accustomed we are to seeing it and how it
can be characterized.
One might perhaps turn to sociobiology: it may be that we are hard-
wired with some version of the Golden Rule, and that free riding-when
painted as such-offends our sense of justice. But if so, our genes are
serving us ill. For as we discuss in the next section, what might make sense
in the world of rivalrous goods makes little sense when applied to
non-rivalrous goods like ideas.
C. Spillovers
Our point is not merely that there is no evidence to justify extending
trademark law beyond cases of consumer harm. An unjust enrichment ap-
proach-one that attempts to identify and weed out free riding-may
210. Cf Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 25, 25-27 (2002) (drawing an analogy to England in the 17th century, which could have
defined a property right in "trading with India" and assigned that property right to a single company,
a result that would certainly have been inefficient).
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actually do affirmative economic harm. While law and economics theorists
focused on real property have often spoken of a desire to internalize exter-
nalities, thereby allowing a producer to capture the full benefits of its
product, students of the economics of innovation have increasingly come to
recognize that in fact uncompensated positive externalities, or spillovers,
serve a valuable social function. Far from interfering with incentives, em-
pirical evidence suggests that these spillovers actually drive further
innovation. Industries with significant spillovers generally experience more
and faster innovation than industries with fewer spillovers."' Dietmar Har-
hoff finds empirical evidence that firms in high-technology industries (the
most innovation-intensive ones) are likely to increase rather than decrease
their investment in research and development in the face of significant intra-
industry spillovers.m
The computer industry shows this dynamic at work. Both Annalee Saxe-
nian and Ron Gilson have shown that spillovers drove innovation in that
industry: Silicon Valley thrived while Boston's Route 128 withered in the
1980s and 1990s in significant part because employees and knowledge
moved freely to new companies in Silicon Valley, but not in Boston.2 13 And
as Alan Hyde puts it, no shortage of innovation resulted:
In California, employees are normally free to change jobs without a law-
suit alleging ... breach of a covenant not to compete . ... There is no
evidence of any social harm from this. In particular, there is no evidence
that firms lack incentives to invest in the production of information.214
More generally, Brett Frischmann and Mark Lemley have argued:
[T]here is no reason to think that complete internalization of externalities
is necessary to optimize investment incentives; at some point, there are de-
creasing returns (in terms of improved incentives) to allowing property
owners to capture more of the value from their inventions. Spillovers do
not always interfere with incentives to invest; in some cases, spillovers ac-
tually drive further innovation. ... [E]ven where internalizing externalities
211. See, e.g., Dietmar Harhoff, R&D Spillovers, Technological Proximity, and Productivity
Growth-Evidence from German Panel Data, 52 SCHMALENBACH Bus. REv. 238, 258 (2000)
("High-technology firms react more sensitively to spillovers in terms of their R&D spending, and
their direct marginal productivity gain from spillovers (in excess to the effect from enhanced R&D
spending) is considerably larger than the respective gain for less technology-oriented firms."). In-
deed, the positive relationship is so strong that some economists use spillovers as a measure of
innovation! See Tobias Schmidt, An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Patent and Secrecy on
Knowledge Spillovers 1 (Ctr. for Eur. Econ. Res., Discussion Paper No. 06-048, 2006), available at
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp06048.pdf.
212. Harhoff, supra note 211, at 258.
213. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 575, 577-78 (1999);
AnnaLee Saxenian, Inside-Out: Regional Networks and Industrial Adaptation in Silicon Valley and
Route 128, CITYSCAPE, May 1996, at 41, 44-45.
214. ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A
HIGH-VELOCITY MARKET 43 (2003).
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increases incentives to invest, the social costs of relying on property rights
to do so still may exceed the benefits. 215
If consumers aren't hurt by the use of a mark on noncompeting goods or
on products that relate to and draw strength from the mark owner's goods,
there is little reason to worry even if defendants in these cases are free riding
on the plaintiff's mark. And there may be good reason to celebrate that cost-
less use. If the mark has value in the other market, and if another firm can
get to that market first, there is consumer benefit to allowing that firm to get
there, since the consumers aren't confused to their detriment by the new
mark, and (by hypothesis) affirmatively value it. For instance, in our world
the University of Southern California and the University of South Carolina,
which have both been in existence for over 125 years, could continue to co-
exist even though they both go by the monikers "SC" and "USC." There is
no room for that coexistence in the anti-free-riding world: if consumers
overlap, someone's use of a mark must surely be a detriment to someone
else.216 But this is simply a positive externality generated by the first mark
owner, and there is no reason it should be stopped absent good evidence it
somehow harms consumers or the mark owner.
A more concrete case of spillover benefits comes in cases in which de-
fendants sell products built on a literary or movie character or a mark that
owes its origin to the plaintiff. If consumers aren't confused about the
source or quality of the goods and if the trademark owner doesn't need to
control the market for these derivative products in order to induce it to invest
in quality,217 there is simply no hann to allowing "ambush marketing" by
companies that manufacture goods designed to appeal to sports fans, or who
write fan fiction featuring literary characters from the trademark owner's
work, or who sell plush dolls featuring those characters. And there is sub-
stantial social benefit, not only to the seller but to consumers, who get a
wider variety of mark-related goods, generally at a lower price and of higher
quality than the mark owner alone would license,2 8 and who get takes on the
trademarked goods and characters that the trademark owner would never
permit if given control. Trading on the goodwill of an established brand
without confusing consumers in material ways can also serve as a way for a
new product to enter a marketplace and therefore expand competition by
215. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 CoLuM. L. REv. 257, 258
(2007); see also Frischmann, supra note 186, at 1018; Lemley, supra note 183, at 1032.
216. See Univ. of S. C. v. Univ. of S. Cal., No. 2009-1064, slip op. (Fed. Cir. Jan. 19, 2010)
(rejecting South Carolina's attempt to register the SC mark on the grounds that it was too similar to
the Southern California mark, despite absence of evidence of consumer confusion).
217. See supra notes 144-163 and accompanying text (making the argument that this is ex-
tremely unlikely).
218. Indeed, as sports leagues have tightened up on merchandise licensing, restricting the
number of authorized producers of merchandise, see Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538
F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010), they have also acted to raise prices across
the board by terminating discounters, see, e.g., Ken Belson, The N.EL is Squeezing Discounters
Over Apparel, N.Y TIMEs, Jan. 20, 2010, at Bit.
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giving consumers information about the new product.219 In fact, there is
good evidence that consumers benefit when they can use familiar packaging
220features to generalize product qualities. More generally, there are con-
sumer benefits to autonomy-to being able to "make whatever associations
she wants with the marks she encounters, even if those associations are not
the ones the mark holder would prefer."221 Some think of these uses as harm-
ful because they involve free riding. But we should think of them as positive
spillovers-benefits conferred on defendants without corresponding harm to
plaintiffs or consumers.
Wendy Gordon explained two decades ago that "[a] culture could not
exist if all free riding were prohibited within it."222 Trademark law seems
perfectly designed to prove her point. It is designed to facilitate a competi-
tive marketplace by allowing consumers to know what they are buying, or at
least from whom. But a trademark law that is distorted into a right to own
markets-one that seeks out and tries to forbid all free riding on a mark-
ends up interfering with rather than enabling competition.
V. TOWARD A 'TRADEMARK INJURY" DOCTRINE
Arguments about market preemption that assume a trademark owner's
right to control use of a mark in remote markets, and free-riding arguments
that take for granted that defendants should not make money using marks
plaintiffs first adopted, carry substantial currency in court. Upon examina-
tion, though, those arguments are circular and lack empirical support. The
simple solution, then, would be to reject the arguments outright.
In fact, however, the world may be more complicated. While the market
preemption and free-riding instincts seem to be driving the results in a dis-
proportionate number of the most troubling trademark cases, those cases are
often nominally decided under doctrines that at least claim to find consumer
harm, such as initial-interest confusion, post-sale confusion, and dilution.
219. Bradford, supra note 139, at 1286-96.
220. As we noted above, in the context of competitive products, research suggests that con-
sumers are more likely to generalize product attributes from one brand to another when their
packaging is more similar. "In other words, physical appearance of the brands had a measurable
influence on perceptions of brand performance and quality." Ellen R. Foxman et al., An Investiga-
tion of Factors Contributing to Consumer Brand Confusion, 24 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 170, 173-74
(1990); see also George Miaoulis & Nancy D'Amato, Consumer Confusion and Trademark In-
fringement, 42 J. MARKETING 48, 54 (1978) (finding that subjects in a field study often purchased
the competitive brand because of product expectations "stimulated by the visual impact of the prod-
uct'). Interestingly, according to Miaoulis and D'Amato, the primary cue for association between
the two brands was not the name but the visual appearance. Id.
221. Laura A. Heymann, The Public's Domain in Trademark Law: A First Amendment Theory
of the Consumer, 43 GA. L. REV. 651, 656-57 (2009).
222. Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149, 167 (1992); see also Marina Lao, Free Riding: An Overstated, and
Unconvincing, Explanation for Resale Price Maintenance, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVER-
SHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 196,
197 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2009) ("[Flree riding exists throughout the economy and the law generally
does not ban it.").
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When claims of consumer injury are mixed with unexamined but attractive
claims about producer injury or unjust enrichment, it has proven all too easy
for courts to find a violation without seriously considering the claims of
consumer injury.
We propose to solve this problem by creating a "trademark injury" doc-
trine. Just as courts in antitrust cases created an antitrust injury doctrine in
the 1970s to try to weed out facially appealing but ultimately anticompeti-
tive antitrust claims,223 courts should require trademark plaintiffs to show
trademark injury as a condition of standing. The situations are quite paral-
224lel.2 Antitrust plaintiffs are supposed to be vindicating not just their own
injuries, but the injuries of consumers more broadly, just as trademark plain-
tiffs are. And, as with antitrust plaintiffs, trademark plaintiffs sometimes
complain of conduct that injures them personally but actually benefits com-
petition overall.
The antitrust injury doctrine requires plaintiffs to show that they have
suffered "injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and
that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful."2  Something
similar would be appropriate in trademark cases. Trademark owners should
be permitted to bring trademark suits only if they can prove that their "in-
jury" is in fact representative of injury to consumers rather than merely a
benefit to someone else. In our view, this would mean that trademark plain-
tiffs should have to demonstrate (1) that their injury flows from confusion
about the actual source of the defendant's goods or about who is responsible
for the quality of those goods, or (2) that the defendant's use causes confu-
sion about some other relationship that is material to consumer purchasing
decisions. When consumers are confused about actual source or about re-
sponsibility for quality, the "injury" to mark owners, if there is one, is
caused by conduct that harms the marketplace more generally. But other
forms of confusion have, at best, ambiguous effects on competition. In order
to assure that mark owners are allowed claims only when consumers are
negatively impacted in their ability to make decisions, in these cases plain-
tiffs should bear the burden of demonstrating materiality. If mark owners
can neither show confusion about source or responsibility for quality nor
that the alleged confusion is material, then any "injury" the mark owner suf-
fers is not a trademark injury.
In some of the cases lacking a trademark injury there will be other legal
mechanisms through which perceived harms can be addressed. In the cases
involving characters, for example, authors can rely on copyright law to rem-
edy certain forms of free riding. But where copyright does not offer a
223. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986); Assoc. Gen. Contractors v.
Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 540-45 (1983); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-
O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
224. Cf Christopher Sprigman, Copyright and the Rule of Reason, 7 J. TELECOM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 317 (2009) (proposing to limit copyright by drawing analogous doctrines from antitrust
law).
225. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489.
188 [Vol. 109:137
Owning Mark(et)s
remedy, trademark law should not step in. Copyright serves different values,
and it is not trademark law's role to backstop copyright protection to ensure
that the author captures all of the value of a work. Copyright leaves certain
uses open for a reason.
A trademark injury doctrine is not a panacea. Courts determined to
sneak market preemption and free-riding concerns into trademark cases
could probably still do so. But requiring courts to assess the ways in which a
defendant's conduct does or does not affect competition should give them a
greater awareness of the need for plaintiffs to prove injury. It will require the
parties and the courts to focus on exactly what is asserted to be wrong with
the defendant's use. And if nothing else, it will make clearer the role of free-
riding claims in deciding trademark cases.
CONCLUSION: INSTINCTS AND EvIDENCE
The anti-free-riding impulse is a deep-seated one, despite its quite recent
importation into trademark law. Perhaps this results from applying our intui-
tions about land, or perhaps we have internalized the incentive stories of
other, quite different IP regimes. Whatever the reason, the impulse has
seeped sufficiently far into the public moral consciousness that the reader's
instinct may well rebel at the idea that someone else should be able to use
my mark to make money.
If we persuade you of nothing else, we hope at least to have convinced
you that this instinctive reaction is worth examining. And once we do exam-
ine it, the free-riding instinct proves remarkably hard to support. Not
history, nor economics, nor logic support giving the owner of a mark in one
market the power to control all uses of that mark everywhere. And the con-
sequences of trying to squelch all free riding will be substantial. Owning
marks should not mean owning markets.
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